Coalition Self-Preservation Failure / 联盟自保失灵
Coalition self-preservation failure / 联盟自保失灵 is the alliance pattern 《资治通鉴·周纪》45｜以史为鉴，君王到底该不该杀人成性？ draws from the 318 BCE five-state attack on 秦国. 楚国, 赵国, 魏国, 韩国, and 燕国 reach 函谷关 with 楚怀王 as alliance leader, while 齐国 promises support but has 孟尝君 / 田文 make the Qi army move slowly.
The coalition has a clear common enemy, but its members do not convert that shared threat into shared risk. Each state wants the others to absorb the first attack and preserve its own strength. Qin exploits the hesitation by sending unusual troops to cut Chu’s grain route; when Chu withdraws, the rest of the army collapses with it.
《资治通鉴·周纪》46丨骂你是个“二百五”的历史来源 extends the concept into aftermath. After the coalition withdraws, 秦国 pursues 韩国 and 魏国 under 樗里子, defeats Han at 修鱼之战, and continues to 浊泽. The failure is therefore not only that the coalition fails to take Qin; it also leaves front-line members exposed to Qin’s punishment.
The concept extends 共同敌人联盟 and 合纵 by naming their failure mode. Fear of Qin can create direction, but a coalition still fails if every member treats the alliance as insurance paid for by someone else’s losses.
Key Claims
- A common enemy is not enough to produce operational unity.
- Shared slogans can hide unequal willingness to spend troops, food, and political risk.
- Slow-walking support can be formally consistent with alliance language while functionally weakening it.
- The first member to suffer a supply shock or morale break can trigger cascading withdrawal.
- Anti-Qin hezong needs enforcement and aligned incentives, not only a named leader.
- Coalition failure can shift from collective retreat into concentrated retaliation against the most exposed members.