Coalition Transit Dependency / 联盟救援借道依赖

Coalition transit dependency / 联盟救援借道依赖 is the rescue failure mode 《资治通鉴·周纪》96丨毛遂自荐（2） highlights after 毛遂 secures 楚考烈王’s agreement to join 合纵. 楚国 may be willing to rescue 赵国, but Chu and Zhao do not border each other; direct relief of 邯郸 depends on passage through 魏国.

The same source then shows why transit dependency is politically fragile. 魏安釐王 sends 晋鄙 with a rescue army, but Qin’s warning makes him stop at 邺城. If Wei cannot reliably move its own army forward, it is even less reliable as the corridor for Chu’s army. A formal alliance commitment can therefore be blocked by a third state’s fear, route control, or hesitation.

The concept extends 联盟自保失灵 and 屏障国救援失灵. The problem is not only that allies withhold help; it is that one ally’s help may depend on another state’s roads, permission, and willingness to absorb retaliation.

《资治通鉴·周纪》96丨毛遂自荐（6） gives the resolution mechanism for this particular case. 景阳’s Chu force is already moving, but it cannot become effective until 信陵君 forcibly takes 晋鄙’s Wei army through 窃符救赵. Once Wei’s army moves, Chu can coordinate with Wei and Zhao, and the coalition finally breaks Qin’s pressure around Handan.

This does not make transit dependency disappear as a structural risk. It shows one extreme workaround: if the route state’s ruler refuses exposure, a private actor may try to seize the route state’s military capacity. That solves the immediate battlefield problem while creating a separate moral cost.

Key Claims

• Rescue coalitions require geography and transit consent, not only shared anti-Qin intent.
• A willing distant ally may remain ineffective if the route state fears the aggressor more than it values the endangered partner.
• Transit dependency can turn military urgency into diplomatic dependence on the weakest or most frightened link.
• When transit fails, the besieged state may become more vulnerable to appeasement proposals such as 尊号式投降方案.
• In this case, transit dependency is solved only through an irregular command seizure, not through normal alliance governance.

Connections

• 毛遂, 楚考烈王, 楚国, and 合纵 - alliance commitment that still faces route constraints.
• 赵国 and 邯郸 - endangered state and rescue target.
• 魏国, 魏安釐王, 晋鄙, and 邺城 - transit state, ruler, halted army, and holding point.
• 秦昭襄王 and 秦国 - threat source that makes the route state hesitate.
• 联盟自保失灵, 屏障国救援失灵, and 尊号式投降方案 - adjacent failure and appeasement concepts.
• 信陵君, 景阳, 窃符救赵, and 成事的道德代价 - Zhouji 96 part 6 forced solution and ethical cost.