合纵 / Hezong Alliance

合纵 / hezong alliance is the anti-秦国 coalition policy that 《资治通鉴·周纪》29丨苏秦励志爽文：知识改变命运 associates with 苏秦. The source says 《资治通鉴》 places Su Qin as the policy’s leader and simultaneous chief minister of the six eastern states, but the host doubts that such a coordinated alliance could suddenly succeed in the chronicle’s 333 BCE setting.

《资治通鉴·周纪》30丨苏秦的“开挂”人生 moves from the doubtful peak image to the first workable step. After failure-driven self-study and 揣摩, Su Qin persuades 燕文公 that 燕国 needs friendly relations with 赵国 because Zhao blocks 秦国 from reaching Yan. The episode therefore presents hezong’s opening as patronage, buffer logic, and shared-enemy alliance rather than instant six-state coordination.

《资治通鉴·周纪》31丨合纵连横 围殴秦 supplies the policy design. It explains hezong by north-south geography among the eastern states, but stresses that the purpose is anti-Qin containment rather than peace. Su Qin tells 赵肃侯 that Zhao’s security depends on keeping 韩国 and 魏国 from being picked off first, then proposes a six-state pact with hostage exchange, mutual rescue obligations, and collective punishment for defectors.

《资治通鉴·周纪》32丨“史上首位联合国秘书长”苏秦 narrates the alliance’s completion. Su Qin moves through 韩宣惠王, Wei, 齐国, and 楚威王, converting the anti-Qin design into acceptance by all six eastern states. The episode emphasizes not only institution design but dignity-based persuasion: each ruler has to be made to see Qin accommodation as both strategically losing and humiliating.

《资治通鉴·周纪》33丨历史第一爽文男主角苏秦 follows hezong into reception and source criticism. In 《史记》’s dramatic framing, Su Qin’s success is so large that Qin troops do not dare leave 函谷关 for fifteen years. The episode flags that claim as unstable because the coming 《资治通鉴》 sequence soon records renewed Qin military action and the collapse of the six-state alliance.

《资治通鉴·周纪》34丨秦国总理如何玩转六国 narrates that collapse. 犀首公孙衍 helps draw 齐国 and 魏国 into pressure against 赵国, 赵肃侯 blames 苏秦, and Su Qin leaves for 燕国. The episode therefore turns hezong from a completed ideal into a coordination problem that Qin can disrupt before or while using direct pressure on Wei.

《资治通鉴·周纪》37丨苏秦：六国集团CEO的不堪情史 qualifies the earlier Su Qin-centered picture. After Su Qin moves from Yan to Qi for 奢侈诱导式削弱, the episode says 犀首公孙衍 leaves Qin for 魏国 and begins contacting the lords on Wei’s behalf, opening history’s “real” hezong business. This does not erase Su Qin’s legendary hezong role; it separates the rhetorical/biographical Su Qin tradition from a later, more operational Gongsun Yan organizing line.

《资治通鉴·周纪》45｜以史为鉴，君王到底该不该杀人成性？ gives hezong a battlefield failure case in 318 BCE. Chu, Zhao, Wei, Han, and Yan reach 函谷关 against Qin with 楚怀王 as alliance leader, while Qi promises support but slow-walks its army through 孟尝君 / 田文. The episode reads the collapse as 联盟自保失灵: every state wants Qin checked, but none wants to spend its own strength first.

《资治通鉴·周纪》46丨骂你是个“二百五”的历史来源 gives that failure an aftermath. 秦国 does not merely survive the Hangu Pass campaign; it pursues 韩国 and 魏国 under 樗里子, wins at 修鱼之战, and continues to 浊泽. In this source, hezong failure creates retaliatory exposure for the front-line eastern states.

《资治通鉴·周纪》50丨张仪是怎样把楚怀王忽悠瘸的 adds an alliance-breaking case inside the same hezong problem. 秦惠文王 wants to attack 齐国, but first sends 张仪 to detach 楚国 by promising 楚怀王 six hundred li of 商於. 陈枕 sees the danger: once Chu cuts Qi loose before verifying the land transfer, Qin has already won the alliance objective without paying the promised price.

《资治通鉴·周纪》54丨我尊你是王，你当我是屁 shows hezong’s broken remains being used as persuasion material. Zhang Yi tells 齐宣王 and 赵武灵王 that the other major states have already shifted toward 秦国 or can be used by Qin, so a ruler who still imagines coalition protection is merely choosing to be isolated last.

《资治通鉴·周纪》55丨 张仪痛失贵人秦惠王 adds a rebound case. After Zhang Yi’s tour, the lords hear that 秦惠文王 is dead and that Zhang Yi is at odds with 秦武王, so they abandon the earlier lianheng posture and rebuild hezong. Coalition logic therefore reappears less as a durable institution than as an opportunistic response to perceived Qin court weakness.

《资治通鉴·周纪》59丨一朝君王一朝臣 adds another rebound after Qin’s next succession shock. With 秦武王 dead, Qin’s brothers fighting, and 秦昭襄王 only secured through 魏冉, 楚国, 齐国, and 韩国 again form a north-south anti-Qin line. The episode keeps hezong as episodic and opportunistic: Qin weakness can reopen coalition behavior even after earlier alignments collapse.

《资治通鉴·周纪》60丨 中国第一位把持朝政的太后竟是她？ then shows the coalition norm from the other side. After 楚国 moves toward 秦国 through marriage repair and the 黄棘 meeting, 齐国, 韩国, and 魏国 attack Chu as punishment for leaving the anti-Qin field. Qin’s rescue through 客卿通 forces the attackers to withdraw, but the 芈横 hostage incident soon breaks the Qin-Chu alignment.

《资治通鉴·周纪》65丨我穿越去给浪漫的楚王念首诗 adds a post-captivity coalition case. After 楚怀王 dies in Qin, 齐国, 韩国, 魏国, 赵国, and 宋国 attack Qin and advance as far as 阏氏. The episode then shows the familiar weakness of the line: Qin returns 武遂 to Han and 封陵 to Wei, splitting the pressure through selective concessions.

《资治通鉴·周纪》68丨惊叹宋康王荒淫无度的狗血历史（1） adds a hezong rebound around the East/West emperor episode. After 齐湣王 drops the eastern-emperor title under 苏代’s advice, Qi convenes five states against 秦国; Qin responds by cancelling its emperor title, making peace, and returning some cities. The case shows hezong working partly as status-pressure and reputational containment, not only as battlefield attack.

《资治通鉴·周纪》76丨谁给了楚顷襄王的自信？ adds a questioned anti-Qin planning case. 楚顷襄王 is said to want 楚国 to join 齐国 and 韩国 against Qin, but the host doubts whether this fits his earlier fear and accommodation after 楚怀王’s death. The source therefore shows hezong as an unstable reported intention, not only as an army already in motion.

《资治通鉴·周纪》83丨诸侯摆烂竟成了经典计中计？ adds a hollow anti-Qin posture case. 魏安釐王 aligns with 齐国 after repeated Qin pressure, but the episode treats the move as weak signaling because both states are damaged and unable to sustain real containment. Qin’s next attacks and the later 华阳之战 show that a hezong label or gesture matters little if the participating states lack credible force and aligned incentives.

《资治通鉴·周纪》92丨历史上第一位著名舔狗是谁？（1） adds a sabotage-before-implementation case. In a 《战国策》 story, anti-Qin activists gather in 赵国 to organize another hezong response, but 范雎 assumes many are pursuing wealth and office. Qin sends money and banquets into Zhao’s Wuan city, producing internal quarrels before the coalition can mature; this becomes 利益瓦解合纵.

《资治通鉴·周纪》94丨杀神白起，长平之战中的“草包”名将？（1） adds a missed-hegemonic-leverage case. 虞卿 tells 赵丹 / 赵孝成王 to send senior figures and gifts to 楚国 and 齐国 before seeking peace with 秦国. Zhao instead sends 郑朱 to Qin, letting Qin advertise Zhao’s peace-seeking and make other states less likely to rescue Zhao. Here hezong matters even when it is not rebuilt: the absence of coalition credibility makes negotiation itself weaken Zhao.

《资治通鉴·周纪》94丨杀神白起，长平之战中的“草包”名将？（2） adds the failed-relief sequel. Once Zhao’s army is encircled and starving, no eastern state turns anti-Qin fear into effective rescue, and Qi refuses even grain aid despite Zhouzi’s shield-state warning. Hezong failure therefore appears not only as a missed negotiation setup or battlefield coalition collapse, but as non-relief during a live starvation crisis.

《资治通鉴·周纪》95丨长平之战后秦国为什么没有灭了赵国（2） adds a post-Changping revival attempt and a psychological obstacle. 虞卿 proposes redirecting Zhao’s promised cities to 齐国 to make Qin fear renewed hezong; Zhao also grants Lingqiu to 黄歇 / 春申君 as a Chu-facing signal. The episode then warns that hezong remains hard because weak states may prefer to follow the strong or profit from another weak state’s disaster, as Wei’s debate shows.

《资治通鉴·周纪》96丨毛遂自荐（1） makes hezong an urgent rescue channel under the Handan siege but also keeps its reliability problem visible. Wei and Qi are geographically closer and easier helpers, yet the episode treats them as unreliable because they had already failed Zhao or even helped Qin take Zhao cities. Zhao therefore turns to Chu through 平原君, and the mission becomes the setting in which 毛遂 self-recommends.

《资治通鉴·周纪》96丨毛遂自荐（2） gives that mission a successful commitment but not an immediate military solution. Mao Sui pushes 楚考烈王 into a blood-oath alliance by making Chu’s Qin-inflicted humiliation politically unbearable. Yet the source immediately adds 联盟救援借道依赖: Chu and Zhao do not border each other, 魏国 controls the useful route, and 晋鄙’s own Wei rescue army stops at 邺城 after Qin’s warning.

《资治通鉴·周纪》96丨毛遂自荐（3） shows hezong under pressure from the opposite rhetorical direction. 新垣衍’s status-submission proposal treats failed rescue as a reason to recognize Qin’s hierarchy, while 鲁仲连 tries to restore anti-Qin resolve by making that hierarchy look morally degraded and personally dangerous. Hezong here is not only a military coalition problem; it is a contest over whether Qin’s title can be treated as prudence or must be read as surrender.

《资治通鉴·周纪》98丨历史上首个老赖登场了！ gives hezong a final Zhou-royal-house failure case. 楚考烈王 and 黄歇 / 春申君 try to use 周赧王’s Son of Heaven title to call the lords against 秦国, but Zhou lacks the army and treasury to make the title operational. The result is a nominal authority mobilization trap: coalition rhetoric creates debt and exposure for the weakest symbolic actor when other states do not bear cost.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》103-1｜司马迁看中的信陵君算是小人吗？ adds a rare effective anti-Qin coalition under 信陵君. After 毛公 and 薛公 persuade him to return to 魏国, the lords answer his reputation and a five-state force defeats 蒙敖 south of the Yellow River. The victory also shows hezong’s limit: even when Qin is checked in battle, nearby positions such as 管城, 荥泽, and 荥阳 can leave Wei’s capital exposed.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》106｜惊人发现信陵君的非正常死亡 adds the post-Xinlingjun structural loss. The episode says that after Qin’s slander and Xinlingjun’s death, 魏国 is progressively eaten away; once Qin takes twenty Wei cities and creates 东郡, future hezong efforts lack the central-plains support point and prestige broker Xinlingjun had supplied. The closing makes 春申君 the next figure trying to carry the anti-Qin banner.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》107｜最后一次合纵伐秦 伐了个寂寞 adds the terminal case. The source compares a Chunshenjun-led version and a 庞煖-led Zhao-house version of the 241 BCE anti-Qin campaign, but both versions end without meaningful Qin-facing gains. Hezong therefore reaches its last narrated attempt as 末次合纵失败 rather than as restored containment.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》108-1｜历史敢当面顶撞秦始皇第一人 adds the geographic aftereffect. Once 杨端和 pushes Qin pressure through 魏国 until Qin meets 齐国, the host says the eastern states no longer have the same hezong option. The concept therefore ends not only because a final coalition fails, but because Qin’s territorial line has begun to erase the map that made north-south anti-Qin coordination plausible.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》112-1｜姚贾是如何凭一张嘴破四国合纵？ adds a post-terminal sabotage case. Even after the earlier final large anti-Qin campaign fails and Qin’s geography narrows hezong space, Zhao, Han, Wei, and Chu can still appear as a four-state anti-Qin plan. The episode says 姚贾 breaks that plan over three years, showing hezong’s late afterlife as a court-by-court vulnerability rather than a stable military coalition.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》114-2｜燕国刺杀秦始皇为何会选荆轲 adds hezong as a rejected slow answer. 居武 still proposes rebuilding ties with Wei, Chu, and Qi and adding 匈奴 support, but 燕太子丹 judges the route too slow and uncertain under immediate Qin pressure. Hezong’s role here is therefore negative: it remains strategically sensible, yet politically loses to assassination because Yan’s time horizon has collapsed.

The concept is therefore both diplomatic and historiographical. It names the kind of coalition Su Qin is famous for, while also recording this episode’s caution that the chronicle’s dating may compress or misplace a more complicated process.

Key Claims

• Hezong imagines the eastern states coordinating against Qin pressure rather than letting Qin isolate them.
• Zhouji 30 makes the first step bilateral: Yan’s need for Zhao as a shield turns anti-Qin logic into a concrete mission.
• Zhouji 31 makes the next step institutional: the alliance must create credible rescue duties and penalties because the eastern states do not naturally trust each other.
• Zhouji 32 makes the final narrative step rhetorical: the same anti-Qin plan has to be translated into each state’s pride, manpower, military capacity, and fear of losing face.
• Hezong is not presented as pacifism; it is a weak-states coalition against the strongest state.
• Its plausibility depends on internal stability and aligned incentives across several states, not only on one persuader’s rhetoric.
• In this source, the dramatic “six-state minister” image is important as reception, but its precise annalistic placement remains doubtful.
• Zhouji 33 adds a second caution: even if the alliance is narratively successful, Shiji’s long Qin-containment claim has to be tested against the shorter annalistic sequel.
• Zhouji 37 adds a role distinction: Su Qin remains a key hezong figure in legend and rhetoric, while Gongsun Yan is presented as the practical anti-Qin organizer after returning to Wei.
• Zhouji 45 adds an implementation warning: even a real anti-Qin army can fail if each member preserves its own forces and waits for another state to bear the first cost.
• Zhouji 46 adds the aftermath warning: failed coalition action can concentrate retaliation on the members closest to Qin’s line of pursuit.
• Zhouji 50 adds a diplomatic vulnerability: Qin can attack hezong by making one member surrender alliance leverage before the promised compensation has been verified.
• Zhouji 54 adds a rhetoric vulnerability: once enough coalition members seem detached, a lianheng persuader can use the appearance of hezong collapse to push the remaining rulers toward Qin.
• Zhouji 55 adds that hezong can return opportunistically when Qin-facing commitments appear under-backed by Qin court politics.
• Zhouji 59 adds that hezong can return again when Qin succession disorder makes anti-Qin coordination look newly viable.
• Zhouji 60 adds a punishment case: a state that defects toward Qin can face coalition attack, but Qin rescue and hostage diplomacy can still undo the coalition effect.
• Zhouji 65 adds a post-outrage attack case: coalition pressure can reach Qin territory after a reputational shock, but targeted concessions to individual members can still dissolve the shared front.
• Zhouji 68 part 1 adds a status-containment case: a coalition can force Qin and Qi to abandon emperor titles even before a decisive battle.
• Zhouji 76 adds a source-critical planning case: an anti-Qin Chu-Qi-Han line is reported, but the episode questions whether Chu Qingxiang Wang’s conduct makes it plausible.
• Zhouji 83 adds a weak-posture case: a nominal Wei-Qi anti-Qin alignment cannot function as hezong when both states lack the strength and coherence to deter Qin.
• Zhouji 92 adds an early sabotage case: Qin can attack a renewed hezong effort by bribing and dividing the organizers before the states coordinate policy or armies.
• Zhouji 94 adds a failed-leverage case: Zhao’s direct peace feeler to Qin becomes isolating because it is not preceded by restored Chu/Qi coalition support.
• Zhouji 94 part 2 adds a failed-relief case: after Zhao is encircled, the eastern states do not provide effective rescue and Qi refuses the grain that could keep Zhao’s army alive.
• Zhouji 95 part 2 adds a post-defeat signaling case: Zhao can try to revive hezong through Qi and Chu land gestures, but weak-state opportunism still undermines automatic anti-Qin solidarity.
• Zhouji 96 adds an emergency-mission case: a besieged state may need hezong help even when the nearest possible rescuers have already proven unreliable.
• Zhouji 96 part 2 adds a commitment-vs-implementation split: even when hezong is ritually agreed, geography and route-state fear can stop relief from reaching the besieged capital.
• Zhouji 96 part 3 adds a status-contest layer: when rescue is delayed, the anti-Qin coalition has to defeat arguments that accepting Qin’s superior title is the only practical exit.
• Zhouji 98 adds the final Zhou-house failure case: invoking the Son of Heaven can widen anti-Qin rhetoric, but symbolic authority cannot replace soldiers, money, and reliable allied action.
• Qinji 103-1 adds a successful reputation-led coalition case: Xinlingjun can mobilize five states and defeat Qin, but hezong success does not automatically remove Qin’s nearby territorial pressure.
• Qinji 106 adds a lost-hub case: Xinlingjun’s death and Wei’s further territorial loss make later coalition organization harder, even before Chunshenjun tries to revive it.
• Qinji 107 adds the terminal case: the last anti-Qin hezong can still be narrated in multiple traditions, but none produces a meaningful Qin-facing gain.
• Qinji 108-1 adds the geographic closure: Qin’s pressure through Wei to the Qi border makes the remaining hezong map less workable.
• Qinji 112-1 adds the late sabotage afterlife: a smaller four-state hezong plan can still alarm Qin, but it is vulnerable to envoy work, bribery, and court-by-court fracture.
• Qinji 114-2 adds a rejected-slow-strategy case: hezong may remain rational, but a pressured ruler can abandon it when the timeline feels incompatible with survival.

Connections

• 苏秦, 赵肃侯, 韩宣惠王, and 楚威王 - strategist and rulers attached to the policy in the source sequence.
• 揣摩, 燕文公, and 共同敌人联盟 - Zhouji 30 mechanism and first patronage branch.
• 尊严激将式说服, 战国军事形态转变, 临淄, and 战国城市繁荣 - Zhouji 32 rhetoric, military, and city-capacity extension.
• 秦国, 齐国, 楚国, 魏国, 韩国, 赵国, and 燕国 - states implicated by anti-Qin coalition logic.
• 连横 and 纵横家外交 - rival diplomatic logic and broader persuader-diplomacy field.
• 犀首公孙衍, 张仪, 啮桑, and 奢侈诱导式削弱 - Zhouji 37 operational organizer, rival strategist meeting, and Su Qin’s separate anti-Qi maneuver.
• 函谷关 and 编年错位 - claimed Qin-containment marker and dating/effectiveness caution attached to this source’s hezong notice.
• 楚怀王, 孟尝君 / 田文, and 联盟自保失灵 - Zhouji 45 Hangu Pass failure branch.
• 樗里子, 修鱼之战, 浊泽, and 秦国东进压力 - Zhouji 46 post-Hangu Qin pursuit branch.
• 张仪, 陈枕, 商於, and 未验地先断交陷阱 - Zhouji 50 Qi-Chu rupture branch.
• 包围威胁式说服, 齐宣王, 赵武灵王, and 连横 - Zhouji 54 use of alleged coalition collapse as a Qin-facing argument.
• 秦武王, 靠山更替暴露风险, and 连横 - Zhouji 55 alliance reversal after Qin court transition.
• 秦昭襄王, 魏冉, 楚国, 齐国, and 韩国 - Zhouji 59 renewed anti-Qin alignment during Qin succession disorder.
• 黄棘, 芈横, 客卿通, 质子外交破裂, and 战国同盟转向 - Zhouji 60 punitive coalition against Chu and Qin-Chu rupture branch.
• 楚怀王, 阏氏, 宋国, 武遂, 封陵, and 欲擒故纵式让利外交 - Zhouji 65 five-state attack and Qin’s selective concession response.
• 齐湣王, 苏代, 秦昭襄王, 东西二帝试探, and 宋国 - Zhouji 68 part 1 title rejection and renewed anti-Qin coordination.
• 楚顷襄王, 东周武公, 九鼎, and 周王室象征威慑 - Zhouji 76 questioned Chu-Qi-Han anti-Qin plan plus the reported Zhou target.
• 魏安釐王, 齐国, 华阳之战, and 战国同盟转向 - Zhouji 83 weak anti-Qin posture and collapse into opportunistic alliance switching.
• 范雎, 利益瓦解合纵, 赵国, and 《战国策》 - Zhouji 92 bribery and internal-quarrel sabotage branch.
• 虞卿, 郑朱, 赵丹 / 赵孝成王, 楚国, and 齐国 - Zhouji 94 coalition-first advice and failed direct peace signal.
• 杨端和, 秦国东进压力, 齐国, 魏国, and Qinji 108-1 - geographic closure after the terminal coalition case.
• 长平之战, 齐王建 / 田建, 君王后, 周子, and 屏障国救援失灵 - Zhouji 94 part 2 failed grain relief after encirclement.
• 虞卿, 齐王建 / 田建, 黄歇 / 春申君, 孔斌, and 联盟自保失灵 - Zhouji 95 part 2 post-Changping hezong signal and weak-state opportunism.
• 平原君, 毛遂, 毛遂自荐, 邯郸, and 楚国 - Zhouji 96 emergency Chu mission during the Handan siege.
• 楚考烈王, 晋鄙, 邺城, 联盟救援借道依赖, and 尊号式投降方案 - Zhouji 96 part 2 successful pledge, blocked route, and appeasement pressure.
• 鲁仲连, 新垣衍, 文明-野蛮框架, and 历史先例武器化 - Zhouji 96 part 3 anti-submission persuasion inside the blocked-rescue crisis.
• 周赧王, 楚考烈王, 黄歇 / 春申君, 债台高筑, and 虚名权威动员陷阱 - Zhouji 98 Son-of-Heaven coalition call and collapse.
• 信陵君, 毛公, 薛公, 蒙敖, 秦国东进压力, and 管城 - Qinji 103-1 reputation-led five-state victory and residual Wei exposure.
• 春申君, 东郡, 魏国, and 信陵君非正常死亡疑云 - Qinji 106 lost Wei/Xinlingjun coalition hub and renewed anti-Qin setup.
• 末次合纵失败, 庞煖, 史书异文政治重量, 寿春, and Qinji 107 - final anti-Qin campaign, variant command traditions, and failure aftermath.
• 姚贾, 李斯, 韩非, 《存韩》, and 利益瓦解合纵 - Qinji 112-1 four-state plan and Qin-backed diplomatic disruption.
• 居武, 燕太子丹, 匈奴, and 弱国刺杀式破局 - Qinji 114-2 rejected coalition/frontier-support alternative.