高层任命越权交易 / High Appointment Bargaining Overreach

Definition

高层任命越权交易 / High appointment bargaining overreach is the political and organizational failure in which actors without appointment authority privately trade praise, recommendations, access, or factional support as if they can allocate senior posts.

Current Synthesis

Hanji 479 creates the concept from 贾捐之 and 杨兴 under 汉元帝. The pair’s scheme is not merely flattery. It bundles praise of 石显, proposed rewards for Shi and his brothers, Jia’s imagined Shangshu Ling role, and Yang’s Jingzhao Yin ambition into one visible bargain.

The source’s management translation is that personnel power is a core authority of rulers and bosses. Touching it without a mandate can offend every side at once: the ruler sees appointment authority being bypassed, the favored intermediary fears being suspected of private manipulation, and the schemer loses credibility because praise looks purchased rather than principled.

Key Claims

• Senior appointment power is politically sensitive because it signals who controls future access, rewards, and organizational direction.
• Private praise becomes dangerous when it appears tied to a concrete office bargain.
• A prior public stance increases risk: reversing from criticism to praise without credible reason makes self-interest visible.
• Favored intermediaries may punish excessive praise if it makes them look like they are manipulating the ruler.
• Workplace analogies are useful only when they preserve the core hierarchy: not every recommendation is overreach, but unauthorized bargaining over top posts is.

Evidence

Appointment authority:

• Hanji 479 says the host treats personnel, finance, and equity in companies and personnel, finance, and military power in dynasties as core leadership powers.

Transactional praise:

• Hanji 479 says Jia and Yang praise Shi Xian and recommend benefits for Shi’s brothers while separately positioning Yang for Jingzhao Yin.

Credibility collapse:

• Hanji 479 says Jia had previously attacked Shi Xian, so the sudden praise makes his political stance look bottomless and transactional.

Intermediary self-protection:

• Hanji 479 says Shi Xian reports the pair partly because their praise could make Yuan suspect Shi of secretly directing a push for rewards and offices.

Counterevidence & Qualifications

The concept does not condemn all recommendations, sponsorship, or advocacy for appointments. Its boundary is the source’s bundled exchange: people without authority appear to trade favor and personnel outcomes while bypassing the ruler’s decision right. The modern workplace analogy is interpretive; the historical legal outcome remains source-scoped to Hanji 479.

What Changed

• Created the concept from Hanji 479’s Jia Juanzhi and Yang Xing case.

Related Concepts

• 权力中心接近优势 - explains why access to the decision maker makes appointment schemes tempting.
• 传话式信息权力 - adjacent mechanism because intermediaries gain leverage by shaping what reaches the ruler.
• 名分合法性叙事攻击 - related because transactional praise damages the legitimacy story around an appointment.
• 职场角色清醒边界 - modern organizational boundary concept that keeps authority, role, and contribution distinct.
• 选官通道竞争 / Official Selection Channel Competition - broader personnel-channel setting in which multiple routes compete to make talent visible.