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concept Updated 2026-08-22 Topics: History, Politics

连横 / Lianheng Strategy

连横 / lianheng strategy is the east-west, Qin-facing diplomatic path contrasted with 合纵 in 《资治通鉴·周纪》31丨合纵连横 围殴秦. The episode presents it mainly through 苏秦’s polemic: lianheng advocates tell eastern rulers to fear 秦国, pay Qin with land, and seek bilateral accommodation instead of joining a collective anti-Qin front.

The concept is not yet developed as 张仪’s mature policy program in this source. Instead, the episode shows the precondition for that later contrast: Su Qin deliberately drives Zhang Yi toward Qin, secretly funds him, and lets him win 秦惠文王’s trust. Zhang Yi is therefore introduced as the coming lianheng counterpart while temporarily agreeing not to disrupt Su Qin’s hezong work while Su Qin lives.

《资治通鉴·周纪》34丨秦国总理如何玩转六国 begins to show Zhang Yi’s Qin-side method in action. Rather than asking all eastern states to submit at once, Zhang Yi works bilaterally on 魏国: after 秦国 takes 蒲阳, he returns it, sends a hostage, and extracts 上郡’s fifteen counties. This makes lianheng more than a slogan against 合纵; it is a practical art of separating one state into a costly bargain with Qin.

《资治通鉴·周纪》35丨历史上第一骑兵教父是他？ adds the style behind that practice. Zhang Yi’s advantage is not only clever wording but mobility: the episode says he does not belong fully to Qin and has not made private enemies of other states, so he can keep using bilateral pressure and reassurance without carrying Shang Yang’s personal credibility costs. Qin’s return of 焦邑 and 曲沃 to Wei is therefore another lianheng move: it separates Wei into a manageable bargain while Qin prepares a stronger status claim.

《资治通鉴·周纪》37丨苏秦：六国集团CEO的不堪情史 keeps lianheng in motion through Zhang Yi’s mobility. Zhang Yi takes 陕城 from 魏国 for Qin, meets Qi and Chu ministers at 啮桑, and then leaves Qin to become Wei’s chief minister. The episode therefore shows lianheng not only as Qin-centered persuasion but as a portable strategist’s method inside a shifting multi-court contest with 犀首公孙衍.

《资治通鉴·周纪》38丨搞兼职的张仪不一般 makes that portability explicit. Zhang Yi’s first goal in Wei is to make 魏国 lead the lords in serving 秦国, a classic Qin-facing outcome. When Wei refuses, Qin attacks, while Zhang Yi’s 《战国策》 plan turns his own presence in Wei into a way to trigger 齐国 and preserve Qin’s advantage. Lianheng here is not only a policy slogan but a career-portable operating method.

《资治通鉴·周纪》39丨历史上张仪是怎样怒怼强敌的 turns that operating method into a Wei court fight. Zhang Yi’s lianheng branch becomes a proposed Wei-Qin-Han line against 齐国 and 楚国, while 惠施 / 惠师 argues for the opposite alignment and inaction. Because Zhang Yi wins the ministerial struggle and remains tied to Qin through 恩赏负债式忠诚压力, lianheng now appears as both a foreign-policy program and an internal personnel weapon.

《资治通鉴·周纪》50丨张仪是怎样把楚怀王忽悠瘸的 gives lianheng a sharper alliance-separation form. 秦惠文王 uses 张仪 to make 楚怀王 abandon 齐国 before Qin delivers the promised six hundred li of 商於. The result is not a stable Qin-Chu bargain but a Qin-favorable rupture: Chu alienates Qi, Qi moves toward Qin, and Qin only then denies the promised scale.

《资治通鉴·周纪》51丨 楚怀王：秦小儿看舅舅如何灭了你！ shows lianheng’s aftereffect once the separation succeeds. Chu is no longer protected by a working Qi tie; instead, Qi joins Qin at 丹阳之战, Qin takes 汉中, and Chu Huaiwang’s rage-driven advance toward 蓝田之战 exposes Chu to Han and Wei pressure. The lianheng gain is therefore not merely diplomatic non-cooperation, but the conversion of a broken alliance into military isolation.

《资治通鉴·周纪》53丨秦惠王用张仪换地皮 shows lianheng after the military payoff, when Zhang Yi personally has to survive the target court. Once released through 宫廷后门自救, Zhang Yi argues that 秦国 can press 韩国 and 魏国 into attacking 楚国, use 巴蜀 downstream pressure, and enter through 武关. Lianheng here is a threat map as well as an alliance split: Chu is invited to accept Qin-Chu brotherhood because every alternative leaves it isolated.

《资治通鉴·周纪》54丨我尊你是王，你当我是屁 turns that threat-map logic into a multi-state tour. Zhang Yi tells 韩襄王 that Han can be split through Yiyang and Chenggao, tells 齐宣王 that Chu, Han, Wei, and Zhao have already moved toward Qin, and tells 赵武灵王 that Qin-led armies can converge on Zhao. Lianheng here is not only bilateral accommodation; it is 包围威胁式说服 calibrated to each state’s weakness and isolation.

《资治通鉴·周纪》55丨 张仪痛失贵人秦惠王 shows the fragile aftermath. Yan accepts Zhang Yi’s final persuasion and gives Qin five cities, but Qin Huiwen Wang’s death makes the lianheng settlement reversible: the lords renew 合纵 when they hear Zhang Yi and Qin Wuwang are at odds. Zhang Yi’s final move to Wei keeps serving Qin on paper while actually securing personal retreat.

《资治通鉴·周纪》60丨 中国第一位把持朝政的太后竟是她？ adds a post-Zhang Yi alignment-switching case rather than a formal Zhang Yi lianheng speech. 芈八子 / 宣太后 first steers Qin toward 楚国 through marriage repair and the 黄棘 meeting, but 芈横’s killing of a Qin official breaks that relationship. Qin then repairs relations with 韩国 and 魏国 at 临晋, turning bilateral accommodation back against Chu.

《资治通鉴·周纪》68丨惊叹宋康王荒淫无度的狗血历史（1） adds a status-politics branch adjacent to lianheng. Qin’s proposal that 秦昭襄王 be western emperor while 齐湣王 becomes eastern emperor is not Zhang Yi-style bilateral land bargaining, but it tries to isolate and bind Qi through a shared title arrangement. 苏代’s answer blocks that Qin-facing alignment by making Qi treat the title as empty and return to 合纵 pressure.

《资治通鉴·周纪》84丨防止秦国灭楚竟用这招？ adds another post-Zhang-Yi branch without making 黄歇 / 春申君 a formal lianheng advocate. Huang Xie tells 秦昭襄王 that Qin-Chu friendship can serve Qin better than a Han-Wei-routed attack on Chu: first pressure Han, station near Xinzheng, bring Wei into line, then turn toward Qi while cutting Yan and Zhao from support. The episode therefore shows lianheng-like bilateral logic being used by Chu to redirect Qin’s own strategy.

《资治通鉴·周纪》88丨你怎么看待凤凰男（2） adds 远交近攻 as an adjacent Qin strategy rather than a simple synonym for lianheng. Fan Ju’s formula does not merely ask states to serve Qin one by one; it separates diplomatic management of distant states from territorial attack on neighbors. It therefore supplies the geographic sequencing that can make Qin-facing bilateral diplomacy more coherent.

Key Claims

  • Lianheng is defined against hezong: where hezong tries to bind the eastern states together against Qin, lianheng turns Qin pressure into separate bargains.
  • Su Qin’s critique treats lianheng persuaders as misaligned agents because the land they recommend ceding to Qin belongs to rulers and states, not to the persuaders themselves.
  • The strategy exploits fear of Qin’s strength and the eastern states’ difficulty maintaining trust with each other.
  • In this episode, lianheng is both an opposing diplomatic logic and a career path for Zhang Yi inside Qin.
  • Zhouji 34 starts turning that career path into policy practice through bilateral concession pressure against Wei.
  • Zhouji 35 emphasizes Zhang Yi’s portable diplomatic identity: lianheng works through flexible interest calculation rather than local loyalty alone.
  • Zhouji 37 extends that portability: Zhang Yi can pressure Wei for Qin, meet Qi and Chu, and then move into Wei government as the anti-Qin field reorganizes.
  • Zhouji 38 makes Zhang Yi’s Wei post a lianheng ambiguity: he serves as Wei chief minister while still using his position and reputation in ways that benefit Qin.
  • Zhouji 39 shows that lianheng can become court factional politics: Zhang Yi’s Qin-facing line defeats Hui Shi’s Qi-Chu restraint line before it becomes stable policy.
  • Zhouji 50 shows lianheng as sequencing: Qin gets Chu to destroy its Qi tie before Qin has to deliver the promised territorial reward.
  • Zhouji 51 shows that lianheng can profit from the target’s post-deception rage: a broken alliance plus angry unilateral war is more useful to Qin than mere non-cooperation.
  • Zhouji 53 shows lianheng as post-crisis coercive reassurance: after Zhang Yi survives Chu imprisonment, he offers Qin-Chu peace while naming the routes and allies Qin can use if Chu refuses.
  • Zhouji 54 shows lianheng as serial encirclement persuasion: Han, Qi, and Zhao are each told that Qin and Qin-aligned states can already surround them if they refuse accommodation.
  • Zhouji 55 adds that lianheng gains can unravel when the Qin court’s patronage continuity breaks.
  • Zhouji 60 adds a broader alignment-switching sequel: Qin can move from Chu-facing repair to Han-Wei repair when hostage diplomacy makes the earlier arrangement costly.
  • Zhouji 68 part 1 adds a title-based alignment attempt: Qin tries to bind Qi with paired emperor status, while Su Dai prevents the status offer from becoming a Qin-facing settlement.
  • Zhouji 84 adds a defensive appropriation of lianheng logic: Chu’s envoy argues for Qin-Chu repair because it lets Qin organize pressure against Han, Wei, and Qi more safely.
  • Zhouji 88 part 2 adds a geographic companion to lianheng: distant accommodation matters because it frees Qin to attack nearby, retainable targets.

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