Qin Eastward Pressure / 秦国东进压力

Qin eastward pressure / 秦国东进压力 is the pattern 《资治通鉴·周纪》11丨 世界风起云涌（1） uses to explain why 魏国 and 韩国 meet at Zaiyang in 366 BCE despite recent Three Jin conflict. Qin defeats their joint force at Luoyang Jinjiao, then 秦献公 wins the Battle of Shimen in 364 BCE.

The concept marks a change in pressure direction. Earlier Zhouji episodes show the Three Jin states fighting each other, dividing older orders, and exploiting succession crises. This source adds a western pressure that can force those rivals into tactical coordination while still exposing their military vulnerability.

The 363 BCE Shaoliang notice keeps the pressure continuous. Qin attacks 魏国 again, 赵国 sends aid, and the conflict appears to continue beyond the episode’s endpoint.

《资治通鉴·周纪》11丨 世界风起云涌（2） extends the Shaoliang branch into 362 BCE. 魏国 first defeats 韩国 and 赵国 at Hui, then Qin defeats Wei at 少梁 and captures 公孙措 / 公叔痤. The sequence sharpens the concept: Qin pressure is real, but it does not automatically make the Three Jin states strategically coherent.

《资治通鉴·周纪》14丨齐威王 不鸣则已一鸣惊人 extends the pressure into 358 BCE. Qin defeats 韩国 at West Mountain, and 魏惠王 responds by sending 龙甲 to build western defenses, making 魏长城防秦 a material expression of the same pattern.

《资治通鉴·周纪》15丨酒不醇引发的世界大战 extends the pressure into the 355-354 BCE Qin-Wei sequence. 秦孝公 and 魏惠王 meet at Duping, but the episode infers failure from the following year’s war: Qin defeats Wei at Yuanli and occupies 少梁. The source also ties the fighting to 军功爵制, making pressure both territorial and incentive-driven.

《资治通鉴·周纪》17丨韩昭侯和申不害 extends the pressure into 352-351 BCE. 公孙鞅 / 商鞅 attacks 魏国, pressures 安邑 and 固阳, and makes Wei repair other fronts by returning 邯郸 to 赵国 and joining the 漳水之盟. The source also treats Wei-Qi peace-seeking around 襄陵 as part of the same Qin-driven rebalancing.

《资治通鉴·周纪》18丨中国历史上第一例人头税 adds the recognition consequence. After years of visible Qin pressure and reform, 周王室 confers hegemon status on 秦孝公 through 王致伯于秦, while 公子少官 brings Qin troops to 逢泽.

《资治通鉴·周纪》22丨公孙鞅诈魏公子卬 makes the strategic rationale explicit in 340 BCE. 公孙鞅 / 商鞅 tells Qin Xiao Gong that Qin and Wei are mutually threatening neighbors and that Wei’s recent defeats create a chance to occupy western advantage, force Wei eastward, and prepare broader control of the lords. The campaign then turns pressure into commander capture through 和谈诱捕 against 公子卬 / 公子昂.

《资治通鉴·周纪》23丨魏惠王 悔不用公叔之言 gives the territorial result. After Qin breaks Wei, 魏惠王 cedes Hexi and moves from 安邑 to 大梁, making the pressure no longer only a border threat but a capital-geography change for Wei.

《资治通鉴·周纪》27丨围观魏惠王和齐威王是咋商业互捧 extends the same pressure onto 韩国 in 335 BCE. 秦国 takes 宜阳, which the episode describes as a long-targeted strategic place comparable to Wei’s Hexi. The notice shows Qin pressure continuing while the eastern states are also managing the post-马陵之战 diplomatic order.

《资治通鉴·周纪》57丨古代发毒誓还有这作用？ adds a later Yiyang branch and a source-layer tension. In 308 BCE, 秦武王 sends 甘茂 to secure 魏国 support for attacking 韩国, but Gan Mao warns that 宜阳 is a large, distant target and that court accusations will erode the king’s trust if the siege runs long. The resulting Xirang oath turns Qin eastward pressure into a problem of sustaining ruler commitment as well as winning territory; it should be read alongside, not over, the 335 BCE Yiyang notice until the wiki has a clearer reconciliation.

《资治通鉴·周纪》58丨赵武灵王如何打造强国 completes that later Yiyang branch. Qin Wuwang initially wavers under pressure from 樗里疾 / 樗里子 and the Gongsun faction, but Gan Mao’s appeal to the Xirang oath produces reinforcements and the capture of Yiyang. The episode then shows Qin’s momentum interrupted by Qin Wuwang’s sudden death, shifting the pressure pattern into succession under 秦昭襄王.

《资治通鉴·周纪》59丨一朝君王一朝臣 adds the administrative and political aftermath of that capture. Qin Zhaoxiang Wang sends 向寿 to regularize Yiyang, accepts 甘茂’s advice to return 武遂 to 韩国, and then faces both Gan Mao’s flight and renewed 合纵 by 楚国, 齐国, and Han. Qin pressure therefore remains strong enough to hold and administer Yiyang, but the succession transition creates friction inside Qin and openings outside Qin.

《资治通鉴·周纪》60丨 中国第一位把持朝政的太后竟是她？ adds a pressure-and-reversal case in 303-302 BCE. Under 芈八子 / 宣太后’s Qin-Chu alignment, Qin attacks 魏国 and takes 蒲阪, 阳晋, and 封陵, then attacks 韩国 and retakes 武遂. After 芈横 kills a Qin official and the Qin-Chu tie breaks, Qin repairs relations with Han and Wei at 临晋 and returns Puban to Wei. Qin eastward pressure is therefore strong but not linear: land seizure can be followed quickly by diplomatic return when the target of pressure changes.

《资治通鉴·周纪》67丨战国“灭霸”白起的军事才能究竟如何 pushes the pattern into 294-290 BCE. Qin defeats Wei at Xiecheng, 白起 breaks the Han-Wei coalition at 伊阙之战, Qin receives or takes Han and Wei land, and 芒卯 appears in a Wei rescue story precisely because Qin’s pressure makes even dubious persuasion useful.

《资治通鉴·周纪》68丨惊叹宋康王荒淫无度的狗血历史（1） adds the next pressure-and-status turn. After Wei and Han cede land, Qin sends 白起 and 司马错 against 魏国 again and takes dozens of towns, proving that concession does not stop the pressure cycle. The same episode then has 秦昭襄王 test western/eastern emperor titles with 齐湣王, so eastward pressure now includes a status experiment as well as continued attack on Wei and 安邑.

《资治通鉴·周纪》73丨历史上自由恋爱的开创者是谁？ adds a 284 BCE pressure case after the anti-Qi coalition. Qin receives wealth when 乐毅 sends distant allies home, but the episode says Qin is not satisfied with treasure. Qin attacks 魏国, takes 安城, and reaches toward 大梁, making eastward pressure reappear as a follow-on to post-coalition spoils imbalance.

《资治通鉴·周纪》76丨谁给了楚顷襄王的自信？ adds the Zhao-front continuation. After 赵惠文王赵何 refuses Qin’s proposal to attack 齐国, 秦昭襄王 attacks Zhao, takes cities, attacks again in 281 BCE, and captures 石城. The source then previews 渑池, showing eastward pressure moving from battlefield punishment into a risky diplomatic meeting.

《资治通鉴·周纪》77丨廉颇与蔺相如 史上最著名的一对“好基友” completes that meeting and adds another Zhao-front battle notice. In 280 BCE, 白起 defeats Zhao and kills twenty thousand troops; in the following Mianchi scene, Qin’s pressure does not turn into Zhao humiliation because 廉颇 prepares against hostage leverage and 蔺相如 forces 秦昭襄王 into a parity gesture.

《资治通鉴·周纪》83丨诸侯摆烂竟成了经典计中计？ adds a pressure-through-rescue case. 魏国 and 赵国 attack 韩国 at 华阳之战, but Han makes rescue a Qin interest through 投敌威胁式求援. Qin’s rapid intervention under 魏冉 and 白起 punishes both attackers and leaves Wei debating another land cession, extending eastward pressure through both battlefield defeat and 抱薪救火式割地求和.

《资治通鉴·周纪》84丨防止秦国灭楚竟用这招？ reframes the same pressure against southern overextension. 黄歇 / 春申君 does not deny Qin’s strength; he argues that a direct follow-on campaign against 楚国 would make Qin depend on 韩国 and 魏国 as exposed corridor states, while a Qin-Chu repair would let Qin keep pressing Han, Wei, and 齐国 in a safer sequence. Eastward pressure therefore becomes the alternative to an overextended Chu campaign.

《资治通鉴·周纪》87丨“狭路相逢勇者胜”终于找到出处了！ adds a failed pressure case on the Zhao front. Qin attacks 阏与 / 燕宇之战 over an incomplete hostage-and-land settlement, but 赵奢 turns distance, narrow roads, a Qin spy’s report, and the northern mountain into a Zhao victory. The concept therefore now includes a limit case: Qin’s pressure can be tactically checked when the defender controls information and timing better.

《资治通鉴·周纪》88丨你怎么看待凤凰男（2） adds a strategic-clarification case through 范雎. Qin pressure is not useful simply because Qin can project force; Fan Ju argues that pressure must be sequenced by distance and retainable land. 远交近攻 therefore narrows the pressure pattern: manage distant states such as 齐国 diplomatically, then attack neighboring states where each gain can become Qin territory.

《资治通鉴·周纪》89丨秦王竟被他怼“妈宝男”？ shows that clarified pressure continuing. Qin fails in a Zhao-front attack under 胡伤 / 胡阳, then sends 武大夫绾 against 魏国 to take Huai and later takes Xingqiu nearby. The same episode complicates the pressure pattern through 秦悼太子’s death as a hostage in Wei and through 秦国四贵权力结构, showing that outward pressure depends on both succession calculation and internal authority.

《资治通鉴·周纪》92丨历史上第一位著名舔狗是谁？（1） extends the pressure into 264-263 BCE against 韩国. 白起 takes cities, seizes 韩国南阳, and attacks 太行道, while 范雎’s strategic logic treats Han as a neighboring state whose internal routes can be cut. Qin eastward pressure here is not only border seizure but 交通线切割, creating the isolated 上党 problem that can pull 赵国 into the next stage.

《资治通鉴·周纪》93丨在梦里藏着偷天改命？（1） follows that pull into the next stage. 冯亭 offers Shangdang to Zhao not because Qin has stopped being dangerous, but because Qin pressure has made Han unable to hold the territory. The result is pressure by displacement: Zhao must decide whether a seventeen-city windfall is worth inheriting Qin’s attack.

《资治通鉴·周纪》93丨在梦里藏着偷天改命？（2） shows why 赵豹 / 平阳君 thinks the inheritance is too dangerous. The fuller 《史记》 layer points to Qin’s cattle-assisted farming, water transport, and reward incentives, making Qin pressure an institutional-capacity problem rather than only battlefield momentum. Zhao’s acceptance of Shangdang therefore pits a windfall decision against Qin’s farming, logistics, and military-merit mobilization.

《资治通鉴·周纪》95丨长平之战后秦国为什么没有灭了赵国（1） shows Qin pressure reaching its most dangerous Zhao-facing moment and then pausing. After 长平之战, 白起 uses terror signaling to weaken Zhao morale while Qin continues pressure through 王龁 against 武安 and 皮牢 and through 司马梗 against 太原 and 上党. Yet pressure converts into settlement rather than conquest after 苏代 makes 范雎 fear Bai Qi’s post-victory elevation, and Qin accepts 垣雍 plus six Zhao cities.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》103-1｜司马迁看中的信陵君算是小人吗？ carries the pattern into 247 BCE under 秦庄襄王. Qin attacks unsubmitted 上党 cities and establishes 太原 commandery, while 蒙敖 takes Wei territory and forces 魏安釐王 to recall 信陵君. The same source adds a city-and-water-control layer: 管城, 荥泽, and 荥阳 make 大梁 vulnerable even after Xinlingjun’s five-state victory checks Qin in the field.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》103-2｜司马迁的“idol” 为何死于酒色 adds the non-battle continuation. After Xinlingjun’s coalition victory, Qin turns to 反间流言楔入 to separate him from Wei Anxi Wang, and the successful removal of Xinlingjun weakens Wei’s best anti-Qin asset. The same source also notes that Qin’s Taiyuan consolidation is not smooth: after Qin Zhuangxiang Wang dies and 嬴政 / 秦始皇 succeeds, Jinyang rebels.

《资治通鉴·周纪》31丨合纵连横 围殴秦 shows Qin pressure interrupting diplomacy itself. As 苏秦 prepares to turn Yan backing into a broader 合纵 project, Qin attacks 魏国, defeats more than forty thousand troops, captures 龙甲, and takes Diaoyin. The episode treats this as the military shock that forces Su Qin to manage the Qin front by sending 张仪 west.

《资治通鉴·周纪》34丨秦国总理如何玩转六国 extends the pressure from battlefield shock into cumulative territorial extraction. Qin takes or receives 殷晋, 少梁, 河西, 焦邑, 曲沃, 蒲阳, and finally 上郡’s fifteen counties, while also using 犀首公孙衍 to disrupt the eastern coalition environment. The pattern now includes force, cession, and 欲擒故纵式让利外交.

《资治通鉴·周纪》35丨历史上第一骑兵教父是他？ complicates the eastward-pressure pattern by showing the rear frontier that Qin must manage while looking east. 义渠 is strong enough that Qin cannot ignore it, but the episode still presents Hexi and Wei as Qin’s central strategic concern. Qin’s partial victory over Yiqu and later return of Jiaoyi and Quwo to Wei show pressure operating alongside frontier buffer management and tactical restraint.

《资治通鉴·周纪》38丨搞兼职的张仪不一般 renews the pressure after 张仪 enters Wei. When 魏国 does not accept Zhang Yi’s plan to model service to Qin for the other lords, 秦国 attacks and takes 曲沃 and 平州. The episode also adds a strategic-use-of-disorder version: Zhang Yi tells 秦武王 that Qi-Wei conflict can give Qin a window against 韩国 and the Zhou royal domain.

《资治通鉴·周纪》39丨历史上张仪是怎样怒怼强敌的 adds the personnel-pressure version. 秦惠文王 keeps 张仪 bound through 恩赏负债式忠诚压力, and Zhang Yi’s Wei-court position then becomes a way to keep Qin’s pressure active through factional struggle and secret alignment as well as direct attack.

《资治通鉴·周纪》46丨骂你是个“二百五”的历史来源 adds a 317 BCE pursuit version. After the failed anti-Qin attack at 函谷关, Qin follows 韩国 and 魏国 east under 樗里子, wins at 修鱼之战, and continues to 浊泽. This makes eastward pressure visible as deep pursuit into the central plains, not only stepwise border seizure.

《资治通鉴·周纪》48丨君王为啥不能传位宰相 adds a 314 BCE pressure cluster. Qin’s attack on 义渠 and capture of twenty-five cities show rear-frontier instability still affecting expansion; its Quwo notice keeps 曲沃 in the pressure vocabulary with a source-scoped Wey wording ambiguity; and its victory over 韩国 at 岸门 forces Han to send crown prince 韩仓 / 韩襄王 as a hostage. The pattern is therefore not a single eastward front but a rolling mix of rear pacification, border seizure, battlefield victory, and hostage-peace extraction.

《资治通鉴·周纪》50丨张仪是怎样把楚怀王忽悠瘸的 broadens the pressure into a coordinated 313 BCE military-diplomatic sequence. 樗里子 attacks 赵国, while 秦惠文王 sends 张仪 to break 楚国 from 齐国 before moving against Qi. Qin pressure therefore works through both field operations and alliance surgery.

《资治通鉴·周纪》51丨 楚怀王：秦小儿看舅舅如何灭了你！ shows the military result of that alliance surgery. Qin joins with Qi to defeat Chu at 丹阳之战, captures 汉中, then faces Chu Huaiwang’s advance through 武关 toward 蓝田之战 while 韩国 and 魏国 pressure Chu from behind. Qin pressure now reaches Chu as territorial seizure, alliance reversal, and multi-front coercion.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》105｜战争花样赵国李牧最会耍 adds a famine-year continuation. In 244 BCE, 秦国 is hungry but still sends 蒙敖 against 韩国, taking twelve cities. The source uses the notice to argue that not every war is a pure drain: against a weak nearby target, campaigning can also seize supplies and extend pressure.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》106｜惊人发现信陵君的非正常死亡 adds the locust-and-epidemic continuation. Qin suffers “蝗、疫” in 243 BCE and mobilizes grain through 鬻爵赈灾融资, yet in 242 BCE still sends 蒙敖 against 魏国, takes twenty cities, and creates 东郡. The pressure pattern now includes administrative conversion after disaster, not only battlefield persistence during famine.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》107｜最后一次合纵伐秦 伐了个寂寞 adds the failed-coalition continuation. In 241 BCE the eastern states make their last anti-Qin 合纵 attempt, but the source’s competing traditions both leave Qin without meaningful loss. Qin then continues territorial pressure around 东郡 and forces 楚国 to rethink capital geography by moving to 寿春.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》108-1｜历史敢当面顶撞秦始皇第一人 adds the Qinji 108-1 continuation. 杨端和 continues the pressure against 魏国, and the source says Qin’s boundary now meets 齐国. This pushes the concept from repeated Wei-front pressure into coalition geography: Qin’s eastward line is now read as making the remaining 合纵 option structurally harder, not merely as another city-taking campaign.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》111-1｜偌大的赵国竟亡于一个妓女之手 moves the pressure to Zhao in 236 BCE. Qin does not need to manufacture the whole opening: 赵国 attacks 燕国, Yan warns Qin that Zhao may become too large, and Qin sends 王翦, 桓齮, and 杨端和 against Zhao. Eastward pressure now includes opportunistic timing against distracted rivals as well as direct city-taking.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》113｜李牧如何用一己之力阻秦国统一 marks the pressure pattern turning into unification war. 韩国 and 魏国 concede land in 231 BCE, Han is destroyed in 230 BCE, and Qin strikes disaster-weakened 赵国 in 229 BCE. The source also preserves an important limit: pressure alone does not solve 李牧, so Qin compounds the timing with rumor, bribery, and enemy commander replacement.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》114-2｜燕国刺杀秦始皇为何会选荆轲 shows the pressure pattern changing Yan’s internal options after Zhao’s fall. With 王翦 positioned forward and Wei too weak to matter, 居武 can still imagine coalition repair, but 燕太子丹 behaves as though Qin pressure has already shortened the clock enough to justify assassination.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》115-1｜荆轲刺秦似乎有点儿草率了 adds the counterfactual limit to that assassination turn. The episode argues that 荆轲’s success might have shaken the Qin court, using 秦武王’s sudden death as analogy, but would probably not have reversed the broader 秦国 trend. Eastward pressure has now become institutional momentum: 燕太子丹 can target Ying Zheng’s body, but not easily undo Qin’s accumulated military, administrative, and coalition-breaking advantage.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》116｜史上最惨太子：被父王亲手斩杀？！ adds the post-assassination payoff. Qin’s pressure no longer only makes Yan consider assassination; after the attempt fails, 王翦 captures Ji, 李信 pursues 燕太子丹 toward Liaodong, and Yan’s killing of Dan cannot stop the campaign. The source then pivots the same pressure logic south as 王贲 attacks 楚国 and Ying Zheng prepares a larger Chu operation.

Key Claims

• Qin’s eastern expansion pushes Wei, Han, and Zhao to respond across older rivalries.
• Qin pressure can coexist with Three Jin infighting; shared danger does not guarantee stable alignment.
• A coalition does not prove strategic coherence; Wei and Han can cooperate and still lose.
• Qin’s advantage is presented as already visible before later Qin institutional and territorial expansion becomes dominant.
• The pattern connects battlefield pressure to legitimacy because Qin’s victory at Shimen receives Zhou ritual recognition.
• Failed diplomacy can be part of the pressure pattern: a meeting may mark attempted management of conflict rather than resolution if war follows immediately.
• Qin pressure can force Wei to trade away recent gains and reduce exposure to other rivals before the western front worsens.
• Qin pressure can also become status: the weakened Zhou court may formally recognize the rising power after its military and administrative strength has become visible.
• The 340 BCE attack shows Qin choosing timing after Wei’s eastern defeat and treating western terrain as the bridge from border war to future hegemony.
• The Hexi cession and capital move show Qin pressure reshaping Wei’s strategic geography, not just winning one campaign.
• The 335 BCE Yiyang notice shows Qin pressure also cutting into Han while Qi and Wei are rearranging the eastern title hierarchy.
• The Zhouji 31 Wei attack shows Qin pressure as a timing threat to hezong: even a persuasive coalition plan can fail if Qin moves before the alliance exists.
• The Zhouji 34 sequence shows Qin pressure compounding across years: repeated smaller gains and a calculated concession can reshape Wei’s territory without one decisive conquest.
• Zhouji 35 shows that eastward pressure depends on rear-frontier stability: Yiqu can be contained or partially absorbed, but not ignored.
• Zhouji 38 shows pressure continuing through Zhang Yi’s ambiguous Wei role: Qin can attack Wei directly while also treating Qi-Wei disorder as an opening.
• Zhouji 39 shows pressure working through office and obligation: Qin’s influence can persist inside Wei through Zhang Yi’s debt to Qin Huiwen Wang.
• Zhouji 46 shows pressure as post-coalition pursuit: once Hangu Pass defense succeeds, Qin can punish Han and Wei beyond the pass.
• Zhouji 48 shows pressure as synchronized with rear-frontier management and hostage diplomacy, not only city-taking along the central-plains front.
• Zhouji 50 shows pressure as theater management: Qin can strike Zhao directly while using Zhang Yi to isolate Chu from Qi before a separate campaign.
• Zhouji 51 shows Qin pressure turning a successful alliance rupture into territorial seizure and multi-front coercion against Chu.
• Zhouji 57 keeps Yiyang central but adds a trust-management layer: Qin pressure against Han can require prior ruler-commander commitment because distance, delay, and factional accusation threaten the campaign.
• Zhouji 58 shows that commitment converting into operational reinforcement, while Qin Wuwang’s death adds succession exposure to an otherwise successful pressure campaign.
• Zhouji 59 shows the post-capture layer: administration and strategic concession can follow conquest, but succession disorder can expose ministers and revive anti-Qin coalition behavior.
• Zhouji 60 shows pressure being redirected by court faction and alliance rupture: Qin can attack Han/Wei during the Qin-Chu warm phase, then return Puban to Wei when Qin prepares to turn against Chu.
• Zhouji 67 shows pressure becoming annihilating and extractive: Qin can defeat a Han-Wei coalition, force land transfers, and make Wei value morally ambiguous persuaders as emergency assets.
• Zhouji 68 part 1 shows pressure persisting after concessions and expanding into status politics: Qin tests emperor language while continuing to attack Wei and Anyi.
• Zhouji 73 shows Qin pressure after a coalition victory against someone else: compensation in wealth does not prevent Qin from seeking land and balance against Wei.
• Zhouji 76 shows Qin pressure against Zhao after refusal: Qin turns a failed joint-war request into city-taking attacks and then a meeting invitation at Mianchi.
• Zhouji 77 shows the pressure continuing through Bai Qi’s Zhao campaign, but also shows the limit of pressure in a diplomatic room when Zhao prepares succession safeguards and Lin Xiangru prevents one-sided humiliation.
• Zhouji 83 shows that Qin pressure can arrive as rescue: a weak state’s appeal can give Qin a reason to strike its rivals and deepen their dependence afterward.
• Zhouji 84 shows Qin pressure as a sequence choice: Huang Xie persuades Qin to avoid overextension against Chu and instead use Qin-Chu repair to continue pressure toward Han, Wei, and Qi.
• Zhouji 87 shows Qin pressure can fail at the tactical level: Zhao She converts apparent delay, spy deception, and a high-ground race into relief of Eyu.
• Zhouji 88 part 2 shows Qin pressure becoming programmatic: force should be aimed at nearby, holdable territory rather than distant campaigns that enrich intermediaries or ministers.
• Zhouji 89 shows the program in motion against Wei while adding the internal constraint: succession hostages and court-power blocs can complicate the use of external force.
• Zhouji 92 shows pressure as internal route severance: Qin can split Han’s geography and make Shangdang unstable before the next Qin-Zhao escalation.
• Zhouji 93 shows pressure as crisis transfer: after Shangdang is isolated, Feng Ting’s offer to Zhao turns Qin’s Han campaign into a Zhao decision trap.
• Zhouji 93 part 2 adds Zhao Bao’s institutional diagnosis: Qin pressure is backed by agricultural, transport, and reward systems that make retaliation more credible.
• Zhouji 95 shows pressure as post-victory extraction and pause: Qin can keep attacking after Changping, but intra-Qin ministerial fear turns possible Zhao conquest into land cessions and rest.
• Qinji 103-1 shows pressure becoming commandery consolidation and capital-environment threat: Qin can lose a battle to a coalition and still leave Wei exposed through nearby cities, routes, and water points.
• Qinji 103-2 shows pressure continuing through information warfare and succession instability: Qin can remove a successful enemy commander through slander while its own new commandery seat faces revolt.
• Qinji 104 shows pressure becoming infrastructural: 韩国 tries to drain Qin labor through 郑国渠, but completion strengthens 秦国’s Guanzhong base and makes later eastward campaigns easier to sustain.
• Qinji 105 shows pressure continuing despite Qin famine: a limited campaign against weakened Han can be framed as resource-seizing expansion rather than only consumption.
• Qinji 113 shows pressure becoming state destruction, while still relying on disaster timing and counterintelligence rumor to remove Zhao’s best commander before the conquest can proceed smoothly.
• Qinji 106 shows pressure resuming after locust and epidemic shock: grain mobilization and commandery creation keep Qin expansion moving despite disaster.
• Qinji 107 shows pressure surviving the final hezong attempt: coalition failure is followed by further Qin territorial gains and Chu’s defensive capital relocation.
• Qinji 108-1 shows pressure closing coalition geography: Qin’s advance through Wei to the Qi border makes hezong less viable as a spatial arrangement, even before later conquest notices.
• Qinji 111-1 shows pressure exploiting weak-state mutual predation: Zhao’s attack on Yan gives Qin the timing and diplomatic rationale to strike Zhao.
• Qinji 114-2 shows pressure changing enemy decision horizons: Qin does not need to attack immediately for Yan’s court to abandon slow coalition repair and reach for assassination.
• Qinji 115-1 shows pressure becoming hard to reverse through ruler-killing alone: the source treats Qin’s conquest capacity as larger than Ying Zheng’s personal survival.
• Qinji 116 shows pressure converting failed assassination into capital capture, failed appeasement, and a pivot from Yan toward Chu.

Connections

• 秦国, 秦献公, and 秦孝公 - rising western power and ruler transition.
• 魏国, 韩国, and 赵国 - states under pressure.
• 郑国, 郑国渠, and 疲敌反强敌 - Qinji 104 infrastructure-pressure branch.
• 蒙敖 - Qinji 105 famine-year attack on Han and twelve-city gain.
• 少梁 and 公孙措 / 公叔痤 - Zhouji 11 part 2 battle and capture notice.
• 石门之战 - strongest battle case in the source.
• Early Warring States Interstate War / 战国早期诸侯混战 and Territorial Control Churn / 城池反复易手 - broader conflict and control patterns.
• Ritual Recognition of Military Power / 礼制承认军事权力 - legitimacy consequence after Qin’s victory.
• 龙甲, 魏惠王, and Wei Great Wall Anti-Qin Defense / 魏长城防秦 - Zhouji 14 defensive-infrastructure extension.
• 秦孝公, 魏惠王, 少梁, and 军功爵制 - Zhouji 15 Duping meeting and Yuanli/Shaoliang extension.
• 公孙鞅 / 商鞅, 安邑, 固阳, 邯郸, 漳水之盟, and 襄陵 - Zhouji 17 pressure and reconciliation extension.
• 秦孝公, Zhou Hegemon Recognition / 周室霸权承认, 公子少官, and 逢泽 - Zhouji 18 status-recognition extension.
• 公子卬 / 公子昂, 耕战逻辑, 和谈诱捕, 安邑, 大梁, and 商於 - Zhouji 22-23 attack timing, capture, cession, and reward extension.
• 宜阳, 韩国, 马陵之战, and 徐州相王 - Zhouji 27 Qin-Han pressure inside post-Maling diplomacy.
• 苏秦, 张仪, 合纵, and 连横 - Zhouji 31 pressure that forces personnel and alliance strategy.
• 义渠, 秦国后方边患管理, 焦邑, and 曲沃 - Zhouji 35 rear-frontier and returned-land extension.
• 平州, 秦武王, 齐湣王, 阴谋阳谋转换, and 乱世职业经理人式流动 - Zhouji 38 renewed territorial pressure and conflict-opening branch.
• 秦惠文王, 惠施 / 惠师, 恩赏负债式忠诚压力, and 连横 - Zhouji 39 personnel-pressure extension.
• 樗里子, 修鱼之战, 浊泽, 函谷关, and 联盟自保失灵 - Zhouji 46 post-Hangu pursuit extension.
• 义渠, 曲沃, 岸门, 韩襄王, and 秦国后方边患管理 - Zhouji 48 rear-frontier, Quwo, and hostage-peace pressure extension.
• 张仪, 楚怀王, 齐国, 商於, and 未验地先断交陷阱 - Zhouji 50 direct-pressure plus alliance-rupture extension.
• 丹阳之战, 汉中, 武关, 蓝田之战, 韩国, and 魏国 - Zhouji 51 Chu-front military consequence.
• 甘茂, 秦武王, 魏襄王, 秦昭襄王, 谣言侵蚀信任, and 盟誓约束下的统帅信任 - Zhouji 57-58 Yiyang campaign commitment, capture, succession, and chronology-tension branch.
• 向寿, 武遂, 靠山更替暴露风险, 魏冉, and 合纵 - Zhouji 59 Yiyang administration, returned-city policy, Gan Mao’s flight, succession enforcement, and coalition rebound.
• 芈八子 / 宣太后, 蒲阪, 阳晋, 封陵, 芈横, 临晋, and 战国同盟转向 - Zhouji 60 Han-Wei pressure and later repair before anti-Chu alignment.
• 白起, 伊阙之战, 公孙喜, 垣郡, 陶 / 定陶, 芒卯, and 联盟裂缝利用 - Zhouji 67 Han-Wei coalition defeat, land pressure, and Wei crisis-persuader branch.
• 司马错, 齐湣王, 苏代, 安邑, 东西二帝试探, and 抱薪救火式割地求和 - Zhouji 68 part 1 post-cession attack and emperor-title pressure.
• 乐毅, 安城, 大梁, and 联军战后利益失衡 - Zhouji 73 post-anti-Qi coalition pressure against Wei.
• 赵惠文王赵何, 石城, 渑池, and 完璧归赵式外交 - Zhouji 76 Zhao-front pressure after refusal and recent Qin-Zhao credibility tension.
• 白起, 廉颇, 蔺相如, and 将相和式内部团结 - Zhouji 77 Zhao-front battle, meeting parity, and internal deterrence aftermath.
• 华阳之战, 投敌威胁式求援, 魏冉, 韩国, 赵国, and 抱薪救火式割地求和 - Zhouji 83 rescue-triggered Qin punishment and post-battle cession pressure.
• 黄歇 / 春申君, 秦昭襄王, 楚国, 白起, and 利益重构式说服 - Zhouji 84 argument for redirecting Qin from Chu overextension back toward eastward pressure.
• 阏与 / 燕宇之战, 赵奢, 战场信息控制, and 制高点时机优势 - Zhouji 87 failed Zhao-front pressure case.
• 范雎, 远交近攻, 齐国, 韩国, and 魏国 - Zhouji 88 part 2 strategic sequencing of Qin pressure.
• 胡伤 / 胡阳, 王绾, 秦悼太子, and 秦国四贵权力结构 - Zhouji 89 pressure, hostage, and internal-authority extension.
• 韩国南阳, 太行道, 上党, and 交通线切割 - Zhouji 92 Han-front route-cutting extension.
• 冯亭, 赵国, 赵豹 / 平阳君, and 无故之利 / 利令智昏 - Zhouji 93 route-severance aftereffect and Zhao-facing risk transfer.
• 耕战逻辑, 军功爵制, 平原君, and 长平之战 - Zhouji 93 part 2 institutional warning and accepted-war prelude.
• 王龁, 司马梗, 武安, 皮牢, 太原, 苏代, 范雎, and 垣雍 - Zhouji 95 post-Changping pressure and settlement pause.
• 秦庄襄王, 蒙敖, 信陵君, 管城, 荥泽, 荥阳, and 大梁 - Qinji 103-1 Qin expansion, Wei crisis, coalition check, and capital-environment exposure.
• 魏安釐王, 反间流言楔入, 嬴政 / 秦始皇, 吕不韦, and 太原 - Qinji 103-2 slander after battlefield setback and Jinyang unrest after succession.
• 鬻爵赈灾融资, 东郡, 魏国, and 蒙敖 - Qinji 106 disaster response followed by twenty-city Wei gain.
• 末次合纵失败, 黄歇 / 春申君, 庞煖, 寿春, and Qinji 107 - failed final coalition and post-failure expansion/capital-pressure branch.
• 杨端和, 齐国, 魏国, 合纵, and Qinji 108-1 - Wei-front continuation and Qin-Qi border interpretation.
• 王翦, 桓齮, 杨端和, 赵国, 燕国, and 弱国相争强国得利 - Qinji 111-1 Zhao-front exploitation of Yan-Zhao conflict.
• 燕国, 燕太子丹, 居武, 荆轲, 王翦, and 弱国刺杀式破局 - Qinji 114-2 Yan-facing pressure and assassination shortcut.
• Qinji 116, 燕王喜, 杀储求和式保祀, 李信, 王贲, and 楚国 - Yan capital loss, failed appeasement, and southern pivot.
• 秦武王, 耕战逻辑, 秦国行政标准化, 蒙嘉, and 刺杀接近凭证 - Qinji 115-1 ruler-death analogy, institutional momentum, and access-through-surrender script.