Research Integrity Incentives

Research integrity incentives are the rules, expectations, and enforcement odds that shape whether researchers keep their work reproducible before anyone challenges it. Don’t hate the replicator, hate the game frames Abel Brodeur’s project as a shift from explaining the Replication Crisis to changing the incentives that produce it.

The episode’s core claim is deterrence through credible inspection. Harsh punishment after discovery matters less than the chance that a paper’s code, data, and claims might be checked by the Institute For Replication or a Replication Games team.

Key Claims

• Researchers respond to publication rewards, journal requirements, career pressure, and the likelihood of being audited.
• Publication Bias and [[StatisticalSignificanceThreshold|significance thresholds]] can reward selective or tuned results.
• [[ReplicationPackage|Replication packages]] and Preregistration create visible commitments, but incentives change more when those commitments are actually inspected.
• Neutral author contact and response windows help keep correction from becoming automatic accusation.
• The strongest system would catch errors before publication, citation, and public spread rather than after.

Connections

• Abel Brodeur, Institute For Replication, and Replication Games - source actors and implementation.
• P-Hacking, Publication Bias, Replication Package, Preregistration, and Robustness Checks - behaviors and tools shaped by incentives.
• Crowdsourced Academic Auditing - enforcement model.
• Economist Trust Crisis, Expert Trust Repair, and Scientific Self-Correction - trust and correction frame.