Resource Curse Governance

Resource curse governance is the institutional response highlighted in How to beat the resource curse in Norway (Summer School). The source uses Norway to show that oil wealth does not automatically produce either prosperity or collapse; the result depends on preparation, rules, taxation, technical learning, spending restraint, and social trust.

The concept extends Political Resource Curse by giving the wiki a positive comparison case. Where the Venezuela branch emphasizes Dutch Disease, dependence, rent distribution, and institutional weakness, the Norway branch emphasizes early expertise from Farouk Al Qassem, Slow Extraction Strategy, the Norwegian Oil Fund, and Social Trust As State Capacity.

Key Claims

• Resource wealth becomes safer when public institutions prepare before the boom changes political incentives.
• Licensing restraint can buy time for technical learning, regulatory capacity, and fiscal rules.
• Heavy taxation and sovereign saving can capture public value without turning all oil revenue into current spending.
• Existing democracy, tax capacity, and social trust are not side details; they are part of the resource-management technology.
• Resource curse avoidance is easier to describe after success than to copy in countries without similar institutional preconditions.

Connections

• Norway, Farouk Al Qassem, Ekofisk Oil Field, and Norwegian Oil Fund - source case.
• Political Resource Curse, Dutch Disease, Oil Revenue Dependence, and Commodity Price Exposure - risk branch.
• Slow Extraction Strategy, Sovereign Oil Fund Governance, and Social Trust As State Capacity - governance mechanisms.