末次合纵失败 / Terminal Hezong Failure

末次合纵失败 / terminal hezong failure is the pattern named from 《资治通鉴·秦纪》107｜最后一次合纵伐秦 伐了个寂寞. The episode treats the 241 BCE campaign as the last major anti-秦国 合纵 attack of the Warring States period: the eastern states still assemble, but the effort gains no durable advantage and is followed by more Qin pressure.

The concept differs from earlier 联盟自保失灵 cases by emphasizing terminal position rather than only coordination failure. By this point, 信陵君 is gone, 魏国 has lost much of its central-plains weight, 燕国 and 齐国 are outside the Chunshenjun-version coalition, and even 黄歇 / 春申君 cannot turn nominal multi-state action into reversal.

It is also historiographical. The source compares two 《史记》 traditions: one makes Chunshenjun the commander of a Chu-led five-state attack, while another makes 庞煖 the commander of a Zhao-led coalition that later attacks Qi. Terminal failure is the shared historical result that remains after the variant details are kept separate through 史书异文政治重量.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》108-1｜历史敢当面顶撞秦始皇第一人 extends the concept from failed campaign to closed geography. After 杨端和 continues Qin’s attack through 魏国, the episode says Qin’s border reaches 齐国, leaving the eastern states without the same practical hezong space. This is the source’s strategic interpretation, not a claim that anti-Qin rhetoric disappears immediately.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》111-2｜我与吕不韦的隔空对话 adds the afterlife of terminal failure in a drought-year notice. The host contrasts the possibility of broader crisis with the actual behavior of the states: 魏国 attacks 楚国, Qin supports Wei, and the others do not convert Qin’s pressure or disaster language into an effective common front. Terminal hezong failure therefore persists as normal politics, not only as one failed campaign.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》112-1｜姚贾是如何凭一张嘴破四国合纵？ qualifies the terminal label without overturning it. The source still shows a Zhao-Han-Wei-Chu anti-Qin plan after the final large campaign, but it is not a restored hezong capable of battlefield reversal. It is fragile enough that a Qin-backed envoy, 姚贾, can spend three years breaking it through persuasion and bribery.

Key Claims

• Late hezong can still mobilize named states without being strategically sufficient.
• The failure matters because it comes after the loss of earlier coalition hubs such as Xinlingjun and after Qin’s commandery consolidation has eaten into Wei.
• The outcome is more stable than the details: commander, participants, route, and post-campaign target differ across traditions, but none of the accounts gives the coalition a meaningful Qin-facing gain.
• The aftermath shifts the story from alliance attack to defensive relocation, as Chu moves toward 寿春.
• Qinji 108-1 adds that terminal failure also has a geographic afterlife: Qin’s advance to the Qi border makes future east-state coordination structurally less plausible.
• After the final hezong failure, even regional stress such as drought does not automatically regenerate coalition discipline.
• Qinji 112-1 shows that “terminal” does not mean every anti-Qin plan disappears; it means late plans are fragile enough to be broken before becoming operational.

Connections

• 合纵, 联盟自保失灵, and 共同敌人联盟 - larger alliance frame and earlier failure mode.
• 黄歇 / 春申君, 楚考烈王, 庞煖, and 朱英 - actors in the episode’s competing accounts and aftermath.
• 秦国, 魏国, 燕国, 齐国, and 赵国 - states whose participation, absence, or weakness shapes the terminal failure.
• 史书异文政治重量, 《史记》, and 《资治通鉴》 - source-critical frame.
• 秦国东进压力, 东郡, and 寿春 - expansion and defensive relocation aftermath.
• 杨端和, 齐国, 魏国, and Qinji 108-1 - post-failure Qin-Qi boundary closure.
• Qinji 111-2, 弱国相争强国得利, 魏国, and 楚国 - drought-year evidence that common crisis does not restore coalition discipline.
• 姚贾, 李斯, 韩国, 魏国, 楚国, and 赵国 - Qinji 112-1 smaller coalition plan broken by Qin-backed diplomacy.