Territorial Reward Mobilization / 许地会师式动员

Territorial reward mobilization / 许地会师式动员 is the late Chu-Han incentive mechanism highlighted in Hanji 167. After 刘邦 breaks the 鸿沟议和 and pursues 项羽, 韩信 and 彭越 do not arrive for the expected final assembly.

张良 diagnoses the failure as material rather than moral. Chu is close to defeat, but the powerful allied commanders have not yet received land clear enough to make the final risk feel like their own. His answer is to make the reward concrete: give Peng Yue the Suiyang-to-Gucheng region and give Han Xin the Chen-to-sea region, so participation in the battle is tied to future territorial possession.

The concept extends 下邑画策 but is narrower. Xiayi Plan names the broad post-Pengcheng recovery design: use Ying Bu, Peng Yue, and Han Xin rather than another single Liu Bang-led coalition battle. Territorial reward mobilization names the final conversion device, where a promise of land changes non-arrival into active co-belligerence.

It also differs from 让封真王式稳局. In Hanji 165-1 Liu Bang grants Han Xin real Qi kingship because denial would be dangerous after Qi falls. In Hanji 167 he is no longer only stabilizing one overmighty commander; he is pricing the whole final coalition so that Han Xin and Peng Yue fight for the anti-Chu result as stakeholders.

Key Claims

• Allies with independent armies may share an enemy while still withholding action until their own payoff is explicit.
• A promise of land can convert uncertain coalition support into battlefield participation, but it also formalizes the ally’s future autonomy.
• The mechanism works because the final war is close enough that promised territory has credible value, not because verbal loyalty alone has become stronger.
• The same move that solves immediate mobilization can deepen postwar ruler-subordinate risk, especially when the rewarded commander already has a strong army and regional base.

Connections

• Hanji 167, 刘邦, 张良, 韩信, and 彭越 - source scene and decision-makers.
• 垓下之战 - final assembly produced by the reward bargain.
• 下邑画策 - earlier design that already named Han Xin and Peng Yue as required force centers.
• 让封真王式稳局, 实力重估式阵营转向, and 分配反噬 - adjacent title, alliance, and reward-risk patterns.
• 三分天下式制衡 and 权力退场困境 - downstream risk once Han Xin’s territory and merit become too large for easy postwar settlement.