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concept Updated 2026-08-23 Topics: History

Xiayi Plan / 下邑画策

Xiayi Plan / 下邑画策 enters the wiki through Hanji 153 as 张良’s answer to 刘邦 after the 彭城之战. Liu Bang has just survived a catastrophic defeat, reached 下邑, and asks who can help him attack 项羽 if he gives away the lands east of 武关.

The plan is a strategic redesign after failure. Zhang Liang does not tell Liu Bang to seek another single decisive battle; he identifies three outside or semi-outside force centers. 英布 can be turned against Chu’s southern side because he already distrusts Xiang Yu, 彭越 can keep attacking Chu’s rear and communications, and 韩信 is the only Han-side general Zhang Liang thinks can be entrusted with large independent operations.

The concept therefore links incentives, delegation, and multi-front pressure. Liu Bang’s reward promise supplies the price, Zhang Liang’s diagnosis supplies the target list, and 随何’s volunteered mission to Ying Bu begins the execution phase. The point is not that Liu Bang has recovered strength already, but that he has stopped treating strength as one army under his own direct command.

Hanji 153 part 2 adds the first execution environment. Sui He leaves with a small party for Jiujiang, while Liu Bang falls back to 荥阳, 萧何 and 韩信 help stabilize the front, and 汉军骑兵建设 under 灌婴 begins to answer Xiang Yu’s cavalry advantage. The plan now has both an external diplomatic leg and a holding front.

Hanji 158 completes the Ying Bu leg. 随何 converts the damaged Xiang Yu-Ying Bu relationship into open defection by first persuading Ying Bu privately at 九江国, then exposing the commitment before a Chu envoy and pushing Ying Bu into 断路式策反绑定. The plan’s diplomatic line therefore succeeds not merely by offering reward, but by making the defection impossible to quietly reverse.

Hanji 159-1 adds the integration and counterattack cost of that success. Ying Bu reaches Liu Bang, is subjected to 先挫锐气后同等厚待, and receives troops to hold around Chenggao. Yet 龙且 restores Jiujiang for Chu, so the plan’s Ying Bu leg buys pressure relief and an attached commander rather than instant territorial control.

Hanji 155-2 adds the northern leg in execution and limitation. After defeating 魏豹, Han Xin asks for troops to move through Zhao, Yan, and Qi and then cut Chu’s grain route from the north. Liu Bang accepts enough to send 张耳 with him, but the repeated removal of elite troops for Xingyang means the full cutoff plan is not completed by Han Xin; the pressure shifts toward 彭越 with 刘贾 and 卢绾.

Xiayi Plan is adjacent to 退让式根据地经营 and 实力重估式阵营转向. The first describes Liu Bang’s earlier Hanzhong survival-and-base turn; the second describes how Pengcheng makes many lords move away from him. Xiayi Plan names the counter-move: a defeated leader uses reward, distrust inside the enemy camp, rear harassment, and delegated command to rebuild a winning field.

Hanji 162-1 adds a late-Xingyang refinement to the same strategy. 袁先生 / 袁生 advises 刘邦 to stop trying to rush back into the 荥阳相持, instead moving through 武关 toward 宛县, refusing battle, and drawing 项羽 south. This indirectly protects Xingyang and 成皋, while leaving 韩信 and 彭越 more room to work.

Hanji 162-2 adds the plan’s command-risk boundary. Han Xin’s delegated northern front has become useful enough that Liu Bang flees to it after losing Chenggao, but also powerful enough that Liu Bang immediately takes Han Xin and 张耳’s seals and military tokens. The plan therefore requires both delegation and 统帅权再收束: distributed pressure against Xiang Yu must stay subordinate to Liu Bang’s central authority.

Hanji 162-3 shows both late execution and collision. The 彭越 leg is strengthened when 刘邦 sends 刘贾 and 卢绾, making Xiang Yu leave the central front again. The 韩信 leg, however, collides with 郦食其’s Qi diplomacy when 蒯彻 / 蒯通 pushes Han Xin to keep attacking. The plan’s distributed-front strength therefore creates a coordination problem once diplomacy starts succeeding.

Hanji 163 gives that distributed system both payoff and cost. Han gains Qi and then regains 成皋 and 敖仓 after Cao Jiu’s defeat, but the Qi success also kills Li Shiqi because Han Xin’s field action is not synchronized with the envoy’s settlement. The plan’s multi-front pressure works, yet it exposes a coordination weakness that the wiki tracks as 军令同步失灵.

Hanji 167 brings the plan to the edge of final victory. After Honggou, Liu Bang cannot simply summon the distributed force centers by command; 韩信 and 彭越 stay away until 张良 advises concrete land grants. The plan’s original “give land and use outside force” logic therefore becomes 许地会师式动员 before 垓下之战.

Key Claims

  • Post-defeat strategy can begin before full recovery if the leader asks the next operating question quickly.
  • A direct military ceiling can be bypassed by changing the shape of war: frontal holding, enemy-side defection, rear raids, and independent campaigns replace one huge coalition battle.
  • Reward promises matter because outside actors need a future payoff that makes risk rational.
  • The best defection target is often someone whose relationship with the enemy is already damaged but not yet openly broken.
  • Delegating to Han Xin is part of the strategy, not an optional personnel note; Pengcheng has exposed the cost of keeping large-army command too close to Liu Bang.
  • The plan turns 实力重估式阵营转向 back against Xiang Yu by trying to make his own strong subordinate and rear threats reprice the field.
  • Hanji 153 part 2 adds that the plan needs a material holding environment: without 荥阳相持, cavalry repair, and Aocang-linked logistics, diplomacy alone cannot buy Liu Bang enough time.
  • Hanji 155-2 adds that delegated fronts can be strategically correct while still resource-constrained by the main front’s survival needs and ruler mistrust.
  • Hanji 158 adds that a defection leg may require a no-return device after persuasion: Ying Bu’s private assent has to be made public and costly before it reliably changes the war.
  • Hanji 159-1 adds that a successful defection still needs post-arrival status management and may trigger enemy counterpressure against the defector’s original base.
  • Hanji 162-1 adds that the plan’s later execution includes deliberate non-battle: Liu Bang’s job can be to lure and fix Xiang Yu while garrisons recover and other fronts attack logistics.
  • Hanji 162-2 adds that delegated fronts need a command recapture mechanism when crisis drives the ruler back toward a subordinate army.
  • Hanji 162-3 adds that distributed fronts can interfere with one another: Peng Yue’s rear pressure advances the plan, while Han Xin’s unsynchronized Qi attack endangers Li Shiqi’s diplomatic success.
  • Hanji 167 adds that distributed fronts still require final incentive closure: powerful allied commanders may wait for explicit territorial reward before entering the decisive battle.

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