Xingshan Theory / 性善论

Xingshan theory / 性善论 enters this wiki through 《资治通鉴·秦纪》101-2｜如何看待性本善与性本恶？, where the host introduces it as 孟子 / Mencius’s famous position before contrasting it with 荀子’s 性恶论. The source uses the familiar “人之初，性本善” formula to orient listeners, while the doctrinal content is Mencius’s claim that people have moral beginnings such as compassion, shame, respect, and a sense of right and wrong.

In this episode, 性善论 is not only a psychology claim. It supports Mencius’s politics: because people have moral capacity, a ruler should practice 仁政, value the people, and create conditions in which moral sprouts can be preserved and extended. The episode also keeps the historical limit visible: Mencius’s program was treated as too remote from practical affairs and was not basically implemented by the rulers he visited.

The concept is paired with 人性可变性. Even when the source presents Mencius as optimistic about original nature, it also says those good tendencies can be gained, lost, strengthened, or buried through later circumstance.

Key Claims

• The source presents Mencius as the main representative of 性善论.
• Moral sprouts are described as compassion, shame, respect, right and wrong, and the roots of ren, yi, li, and zhi.
• 性善论 supports benevolent rule rather than only private moral cultivation.
• The episode does not make Mencian optimism politically automatic; it notes the gap between doctrine and ruler uptake.
• The theory sits inside a wider human-plasticity frame, not a simple fixed-good label.

Connections

• 孟子 / Mencius and 《孟子》 - thinker and text associated with the theory.
• 性恶论 - contrasting Xunzian position in the same source.
• 人性可变性 and Fixed Human Nature Politics - broader formation and anti-fixity frames.
• 孟子仁政, 孟子的民本合法性, and 孟子理想主义的限度 - political implications and limits.