Podcast Atlas
entity Updated 2026-08-22

秦国 / Qin State

《资治通鉴·秦纪》99-3｜荀子兵法里藏着人性的秘密 adds Qin as the strongest example inside 荀子’s military hierarchy short of hegemonic and kingly armies. The episode treats Qin’s strength as real and cumulative from 秦孝公 to 秦昭襄王: harsh control, surveillance, reward, punishment, and military-merit incentives can produce formidable profit-driven battlefield power. Xunzi’s point is evaluative rather than dismissive: Qin’s锐士 can outrank Qi技击 and Wei武卒 while still falling below renyi-based military legitimacy.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》99-4｜谁是孔子后最伟大的思想家？ adds Qin’s post-Zhou consolidation and succession puzzle. After the 周王室 collapse, Zhou people flee east rather than accept Qin rule, while Qin carries Zhou treasures back to 咸阳. The same source then records 秦昭襄王’s death in 251 BCE and highlights that the six states send condolences instead of using the succession moment to attack, showing Qin’s prestige or deterrence as the next explanatory problem.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》100-1｜皇帝中的超长待机王过世了 answers that puzzle by adding Qin’s late Zhaoxiang-era ritual hierarchy. The episode treats “天下来宾,” punitive action against late 魏国, a tianzi-like sacrifice at old Qin Yong city, and 韩桓惠王’s personal mourning as evidence of 准天子式秦霸权. Qin’s dominance is therefore not only territorial; it is also visible in which states attend, apologize, mourn, and fear retaliation for failed protocol.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》101-1｜这位倒霉君王登基三天即猝死 moves Qin from late-Zhaoxiang hierarchy into the compressed Xiaowen-Zhuangxiang succession. It distinguishes 安国君柱 / 秦孝文王’s earlier succession transition from formal 250 BCE accession, records his death after three days, and keeps 吕不韦 murder suspicion unresolved. Qin’s court then immediately elevates 子楚 / 秦庄襄王 and the two maternal lines of 华阳夫人 and 夏姬 / 夏太后.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》104｜阴谋失算让秦国版图又又又膨胀了 adds Qin’s early Ying Zheng capacity branch. Even while the young ruler depends on 吕不韦 and internal unrest persists around Jinyang, Qin absorbs 韩国’s hostile 郑国渠 proposal because it also serves Guanzhong irrigation and war logistics. The episode makes Qin’s rise depend on turning enemies’ delaying tactics into durable state capacity, then shows renewed attack on 魏国 as the external payoff.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》105｜战争花样赵国李牧最会耍 keeps Qin’s early Ying Zheng pressure active in 244 BCE. The source says Qin is suffering famine but still sends 蒙敖 against 韩国, taking twelve cities. Qin’s role here is a narrow but important continuity point: internal strain and resource scarcity do not stop targeted eastward campaigns when the opponent is weak enough.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》106｜惊人发现信陵君的非正常死亡 extends that pressure through a harsher disaster setting. In 243 BCE, Qin faces “蝗、疫”; the episode expands this into locust-driven crop loss, hunger, and epidemic risk, then says Qin mobilizes private grain through 鬻爵赈灾融资. The following year Qin sends 蒙敖 against 魏国, takes twenty cities, and creates 东郡, showing disaster response and conquest administration in the same sequence.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》107｜最后一次合纵伐秦 伐了个寂寞 shows Qin surviving the final anti-Qin 合纵 campaign. The source preserves conflicting accounts over whether 黄歇 / 春申君 or 庞煖 led the coalition, but the Qin-facing result is stable: the eastern states gain nothing durable, and Qin continues pressure afterward by taking additional territory into 东郡 and forcing 楚国 to relocate to 寿春.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》108-1｜历史敢当面顶撞秦始皇第一人 adds the next Qin sequence in 238 BCE. Externally, 杨端和 continues the Wei campaign until the episode says Qin’s border reaches 齐国, narrowing any remaining practical basis for 合纵. Internally, the state absorbs the 嫪毐 rebellion at 雍城, the punishment of 赵姬, and 茅焦’s 赴死式直谏, making Qin’s consolidation depend on court feedback as well as military pressure.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》110-1｜李斯：米仓老鼠和下水道老鼠你怎么选？ moves Qin into Ying Zheng’s tenth year, 237 BCE, and shows a talent-policy backlash after internal consolidation. With 吕不韦 removed from central office and foreign-origin figures such as 嫪毐 and 郑国 available as cautionary examples, Qin royal-clan ministers push the 逐客令. The episode makes Qin’s old talent-absorption strength unstable: imported expertise and guest service can become suspect when court factions translate security anxiety into a purge of outsiders like 李斯.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》110-2｜秦始皇的CP为何被驱逐出国 supplies the reversal and strategic payoff. 李斯 uses 《谏逐客书》 to argue that Qin’s own past greatness came from accepting guest talent under rulers such as 秦穆公, 秦孝公, 秦惠王 / 嬴驷, and 秦昭襄王. Qin therefore cancels the expulsion order and keeps a talent policy aligned with conquest, while the source’s closing says Qin then combines bribery, ruler-minister alienation, targeted killing, and military attack against the remaining states.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》111-1｜偌大的赵国竟亡于一个妓女之手 gives the next field application of that conquest posture in 236 BCE. After 赵国 attacks 燕国, a Yan envoy warns 嬴政 / 秦始皇 that a Zhao annexation of Yan would create a larger Qin problem. Qin then sends 王翦, 桓齮, and 杨端和 against Zhao, turning weak-state mutual predation into another Qin opening.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》111-2｜我与吕不韦的隔空对话 gives the internal and diplomatic aftermath in 235 BCE. Internally, Qin finishes the Lu Buwei branch by forcing the former chancellor toward Shu and then punishing mourners after his suicide, turning old retainer networks into a security problem. Externally, the episode says drought does not stop war: Wei attacks Chu and Qin sends four armies to aid Wei, making late Qin power visible both in court cleanup and in choosing when to support one rival state against another.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》112-1｜姚贾是如何凭一张嘴破四国合纵？ turns that post-cleanup posture toward anti-coalition diplomacy. 李斯 first pushes the “attack Han first” line, then helps convert 姚贾 from a 赵国 envoy into a Qin asset. 嬴政 / 秦始皇 backs Yao Jia visibly with vehicles, money, clothing, and a sword, and the mission breaks a Zhao-Han-Wei-Chu 合纵 plan over three years through persuasion and bribery. Qin’s strength here is institutional and diplomatic as much as military: it can absorb displaced talent, fund long envoy work, and turn rival-court incentives against coordination.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》112-2｜秦始皇也是他的书迷？ adds the adjacent military and intellectual setup. Militarily, 桓齮 devastates Zhao in 234 BCE, is defeated by 李牧, and then renews attacks in 233 BCE. Strategically, Qin prepares to attack 韩国 first, while Ying Zheng’s admiration for 韩非’s 《孤愤》 and 《五蠹》 creates a talent-attraction problem inside a conquest plan: Qin can want Han Fei’s mind without ceasing to make Han its target.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》112-3｜韩非与姚贾论战，秦王当裁判 makes Qin’s late-conquest talent policy double-edged. The same court can reward 姚贾 after a successful bribery-and-persuasion mission and still destroy 韩非 once 李斯 reframes a foreign royal as a permanent security problem. Qin’s advantage therefore includes talent absorption, but also a court environment where loyalty suspicion and ministerial rivalry can eliminate a useful mind without slowing conquest.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》113｜李牧如何用一己之力阻秦国统一 shifts Qin from court removal and coalition sabotage into explicit state destruction. Qin receives land from 韩国 and 魏国, captures 韩王安 / Han An in 230 BCE, and then attacks 赵国 in 229 BCE after earthquake, famine, and drought have weakened it. Yet the source still makes 李牧 the obstacle Qin avoids through indirect means: 顿弱’s rumor work and bribery of 郭开 turn Zhao’s own court against Li Mu and 司马尚.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》114-1｜今天聊聊 嬴政都有哪些残忍手段 gives Qin the next conquest payoff. With Li Mu and Sima Shang removed, 王翦 defeats Zhao’s replacement command, captures 邯郸, and takes 赵迁 / 赵幽缪王 alive. 嬴政 / 秦始皇 then uses Handan as a personal-revenge site, while Zhao Qian’s continued survival in exile weakens 赵嘉’s ability to claim the Zhao title from 代地 / 代国.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》114-2｜燕国刺杀秦始皇为何会选荆轲 shows Qin’s pressure working even when Qin is mostly offstage. Wang Jian’s Yan-facing position, Qin’s threat to punish sheltering 樊无忌, and the collapse of practical hezong timing push 燕太子丹 toward weak-state assassination as a substitute for direct resistance.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》115-1｜荆轲刺秦似乎有点儿草率了 makes Qin’s late-conquest advantage the reason that shortcut is strategically limited. The source argues that even if 荆轲 killed 嬴政 / 秦始皇, Qin might suffer court disorder like the crisis after 秦武王’s death but would still retain the institutional momentum built from 商鞅变法, 耕战逻辑, and administrative standardization.

The same episode also shows Qin’s court as both powerful and permeable. 蒙嘉 can translate 燕国’s surrender script, 樊无忌’s head, and the 督亢地图 into a high-ceremony audience, but that very ceremony overwhelms 秦武阳. Qin is therefore not merely a battlefield machine; its ritual center becomes the stage on which the weak-state assassination plan has to survive.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》115-2｜秦王大难不死之后干了件你不知道的事？ completes that hostile-access branch. The Qin court almost loses its ruler because envoy protocol, unarmed ministers, outside guards, and Ying Zheng’s long sword create a short window for 荆轲. Once Ying Zheng survives and counters, Qin converts palace shock into eastward war: more troops are sent into the former Zhao area, 王翦 attacks 燕国, and the Yan-Dai force under 赵嘉 is defeated west of the Yi River.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》116｜史上最惨太子：被父王亲手斩杀？！ extends that conversion from retaliation to terminal conquest logic. Qin takes Ji, pushes 燕王喜 and 燕太子丹 toward Liaodong, and does not stop when Dan is killed as an appeasement payment. The source then turns Qin’s attention south: 王贲 attacks 楚国, while Ying Zheng chooses 李信 and 蒙恬 after Li Xin’s lower troop estimate displaces 王翦’s more cautious 600,000-person requirement.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》117-1｜啪啪打脸！历史上“爽文”的开山鼻祖 shows Qin’s conquest machine operating on a parallel Wei front. 王贲 attacks 魏国, uses water against 大梁, and destroys Wei after 魏王假 surrenders. The same episode then contrasts Qin’s talent-use tradition with Wei’s talent loss and shifts into the 唐雎 story, where Qin power is rhetorically checked even though the historical details remain doubtful.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》117-2｜学着点！秦朝武将竟然如此高情商？ shows that Qin’s conquest machine can still suffer a severe operational correction. 李信 and 蒙恬 initially advance against 楚国, but 项燕 defeats them near 南郡. Qin then recovers by having 嬴政 / 秦始皇 return to 王翦’s 600,000-person requirement, while Wang Jian manages the danger of commanding so much state force through 贪财人设式自保.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》118-1｜王翦率六十万大军 对战项燕！好戏开场了！ turns that recovery into a logistical campaign. Qin’s 600,000-person army does not simply crush Chu on contact; it can sit behind fortifications, remain fed, and wait for 楚国’s mobilized army to exhaust provisions and morale. Qin’s advantage is therefore scale plus endurance, and 坚壁耗敌式耐心 becomes another expression of state capacity.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》118-2｜吃瓜了！王室的瓜 包甜！ turns the same Chu endpoint into a loyalty and administration problem. 昌平君 is read as a Qin chancellor whose Chu royal identity helps explain distrust, exile, and rebellion, while Qin’s post-victory setup of a temporary Chu commandery becomes a 灭国后的郡县化过渡 case. Qin’s conquest capacity is therefore military, personnel-screening, and administrative at once.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》119-1｜拆解荆轲刺秦必败的秘密 adds the late Yan endpoint in 222 BCE. Qin sends 王贲 against Liaodong, captures 燕王喜, and extinguishes 燕国 after the earlier 荆轲 attempt and 燕太子丹 killing have failed to divert Qin’s objective. The source therefore strengthens the page’s conquest-machine theme: Qin is not satisfied by revenge or appeasement when the strategic goal is state destruction and incorporation.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》119-3｜历史上第一位真正意义上“垂帘听政”太后 pushes Qin to the last stage before Qi. In the north, 王贲 uses the now-controlled Yan region to attack 代国 and capture 赵嘉. In the south, 王翦 pacifies Jiangnan, subdues 百越, and establishes 会稽郡. The episode’s Qi analysis shows the other side of Qin power: long reassurance of distant 齐国 works under 远交近攻 until the remaining targets have disappeared.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》120-1｜谁是皇帝中的妈宝男？ completes the state-conquest arc. In 221 BCE, Qin uses Wang Ben’s northern route to force 齐国 into surrender, creating the transition from the 战国时期 to the Qin imperial order. The source then shifts to Qin’s need to govern memory: the new regime portrays each conquered state as the oath-breaker, rebel, aggressor, assassin sponsor, or conspirator, making Qin’s expansion legible as 兼并自卫叙事.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》120-2｜秦朝第一套VI设计理念 adds the first symbolic design layer after that conquest endpoint. Qin does not only absorb territory; it standardizes sovereignty language around “皇帝,” “制,” “诏,” and the exclusive imperial “朕,” abolishes the old 谥号 mechanism in favor of numbered emperors, and builds a water-virtue package through 阴阳五行政治理论. Black color, October year-start, number six, 德水 naming, and 黔首 terminology become state-level signs of the new order.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》120-3｜揭秘秦始皇为何发明郡县制 adds the territorial settlement behind that symbolic order. 王绾 proposes using imperial sons to govern distant former Yan, Qi, and Chu lands, but 李斯 argues that Qin should avoid recreating the Zhou pattern of hereditary lords drifting into war. Qin therefore makes the commandery-county system empire-wide, rewarding relatives and officials through state revenues rather than sovereign fiefs; in the source’s long view, this is the institutional branch behind “百代皆行秦政法.”

《资治通鉴·秦纪》120-4｜并六国后 秦始皇教你如何守江山 adds what Qin then does to make that empire harder to reverse. It collects weapons and casts them into palace figures at 咸阳, standardizes measurement instruments and inspections, relocates 120,000 powerful households to the capital, and uses direct local government to push Qin-style order into conquered society. The source therefore turns Qin’s post-unification profile from symbolic and territorial design into a full imperial homogenization program backed by disarmament and elite relocation.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》121｜嬴政造世界最早高速公路 2200年荒草不生 adds the old-land and infrastructure sequel. Qin Shi Huang’s westward route through 陇西郡 and 北地郡 is read as a return into Qin’s old ritual geography for 高庙礼 at 雍城, while 极庙, 太一, 秦代宇宙化都城规划, and 驰道 show Qin converting victory into roads, ritual architecture, and capital-centered cosmic order.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》122-1｜揭秘秦始皇封禅为什么选泰山 adds the eastern sacred-geography counterpart. Qin no longer only displays order from 咸阳 or old Qin lands; it carries imperial presence into former six-state territory and uses 泰山 to claim 天命合法性. The source also preserves a Qin-versus-Qi-Lu ritual tension: Qin summons scholars from the eastern learned world, but their disagreement leaves Qin’s own heaven-sacrifice procedure as the practical ritual template for 封禅礼制合法性.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》122-2｜日本人到底是不是徐福的后代？ gives that eastern claim a coastal and textual sequel. Qin absorbs former Qi sacred geography by sacrificing to the 齐地八神, turns 琅琊山 into a settlement-and-inscription site, and has the 琅琊刻石政治纲领 restate agriculture, unified standards, law, peace, and imperial reach. The same source shows a risk inside Qin’s sacred-geographic expansion: Yan-Qi fangshi can translate the emperor’s sea-facing hopes into 徐福’s costly 蓬莱 mission.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》122-3｜秦始皇竟和神仙撕起来了！ adds the return-route side of Qin’s post-unification tour. At 彭城 / 徐州, Qin cannot recover 九鼎 despite ritual preparation and mass search labor; at 湘山祠, Qin Shi Huang converts a river-wind obstruction into punishment of a Chu sacred landscape. This makes Qin’s imperial order look uneven across conquered cultures: former-Qi gods can be worshiped and absorbed, while a Chu deity’s resistance is answered through visible domination.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》123-1｜神之预言：“亡秦者胡”竟是指…？ shows Qin’s post-unification order facing two pressures at once. Internally, 张良’s 博浪沙 attack reveals that destroyed-state memory can still produce targeted resistance even after weapon seizure. Administratively, Qin Shi Huang’s order to remove large walls and levees extends imperial homogenization into the built environment. Externally, 卢生’s “亡秦者胡” report gives a prophecy frame for sending 蒙恬 north against 匈奴.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》123-2｜古代时期的“倒插门”到底有多危险 explains why Qin continues war after the old interstate field has been absorbed. The episode argues that 商鞅变法, 耕战逻辑, and the 军功爵制 left Qin with a reward-seeking military society that could not simply be told to rest. Southern war against 百越 drafts捕亡人,赘婿, and merchants under 边缘身份征发, then becomes 桂林郡, 南海郡, and 象郡; northern war against 匈奴 lets Meng Tian recover territory, create counties, link walls, and hold 上郡. Qin’s post-unification state therefore keeps converting social pressure into frontier administration.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》124｜焚书坑儒？！我在B站为秦始皇平反！ adds Qin’s textual-control layer in 213 BCE. After 淳于越 uses antiquity to argue against direct rule, 李斯 frames private scholars, private histories, and classical criticism as threats to central law and unity. Qin’s book-burning policy therefore becomes another post-unification control instrument alongside commanderies, measurements, elite relocation, disarmament, roads, and frontier campaigns: the state now tries to govern what counts as legitimate learning and political judgment through 学在王官式知识垄断.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》125-2｜历史上秦始皇为何要焚书坑儒 completes the separate坑儒 branch in 212 BCE. The source ties Qin’s late imperial violence to the failed immortal-search economy, 侯生 and 卢生’s flight, 君臣反馈失灵, interrogation in 咸阳, and a mass punishment publicized as deterrence. It therefore adds 秦代坑儒事件 as a political-violence endpoint of late Qin control rather than as a simple continuation of 焚书.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》125-1｜秦始皇修建史上最大烂尾楼阿房宫 adds Qin’s late imperial-construction and palace-secrecy layer in 212 BCE. 秦直道, 阿房宫, 秦始皇陵, material transport, palace networks, and forced relocation all show a state still able to mobilize enormous resources. The same source makes that capacity politically brittle through 帝国工程过载 and 帝王行踪保密: overlapping projects strain labor and succession timing, while immortal-seeking advice turns palace geography into lethal information control.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》126｜秦始皇死因之谜（2） adds the state-action side of the 211 BCE omen crisis. After “祖龙死” and “游徙吉,” Qin can still mobilize population and rank incentives quickly: thirty thousand households are sent toward the northern frontier, where the episode reads the target as 北河 and 榆中 rather than a migration out of “河北.” The same source therefore makes late Qin state capacity serve both frontier management and omen-countermeasure mobility.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》127-3｜海外回归一批竹简 揭开胡亥立帝之谜！ adds Qin’s succession-source conflict after that final tour. In the received account, state capacity is turned toward concealment, forged written command, and fast return; in the 《赵正书》 account, the same distance from 咸阳 becomes an argument for 临终就近立储. The episode therefore makes Qin’s late state order look both highly capable and institutionally fragile: a ruler-centered empire can move people, roads, documents, and mourning rituals, but still lacks a succession procedure immune to source conflict and factional capture.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》128-1｜不想篡位的太监 不是个好奸臣 adds the first-year consequence of that fragility. 胡亥 / 秦二世 can imitate Qin Shi Huang’s inspection-tour form and extend old inscriptions, but the episode says the act lacks the founding ruler’s earned authority and adds burden. Back in Xianyang, 赵高 turns Hu Hai’s fear of royal brothers and old ministers into harsh-law elimination, so Qin’s late legal and administrative machinery begins consuming its own imperial family and former pillars through 继位合法性清洗.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》128-2｜起来！被压迫的人们！ turns that internal damage into the first open mass revolt. The source says Hu Hai’s rule intensifies harsh law, revived 阿房宫 construction, capital-guard recruitment, and commandery transport burdens until social pressure becomes “官逼民反.” When rain makes a nine-hundred-person conscript unit miss its deadline at 大泽乡, Qin’s context-blind punishment regime creates a 误期死局式起义触发, and 陈胜 and 吴广 turn desperation into anti-Qin rebellion through 起义天命制造.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》129-2｜历史上喝酒能误多大事？转给酒鬼老公看这集 shows Qin fighting collapse through both coercive recovery and worsening political incentives. In the field, 章邯 defeats 田臧 and other Zhang Chu commanders after 吴广’s death, proving Qin can still exploit rebel fragmentation. At court, 李斯 answers 胡亥 / 秦二世’s blame with 督责式压榨政治, encouraging tax extraction and killing as official performance and further eroding the regime’s social base.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》130-4｜如何定论秦相李斯的下场 adds the next court-side failure. 赵高 turns Hu Hai’s palace seclusion into 宫廷接触垄断, then uses 李由’s 三川 office and rebel rumors to isolate 李斯. When Li Si, 冯去疾, and 冯劫 / 冯杰 advise stopping 阿房宫 and easing burdens, Hu Hai treats the advice as ministerial failure and imprisons them. Qin therefore retains offices and memorial forms while losing the ability to convert elite warning into state repair.

Qinji 138 part 2 adds the terminal form of that failure. After 阎乐 forces Hu Hai’s suicide at 望夷宫, Zhao Gao acknowledges Qin’s contraction through 帝号退回王号 and tries to install 子婴 as king rather than emperor. Ziying removes Zhao Gao through 宗庙仪式反制政变, but the state has no time to rebuild: Liu Bang’s side breaks the 峣关-蓝田 line under 张良’s advice.

Hanji 139 completes Qin’s collapse as surrender and occupation. 子婴 has no remaining troops or defensible capital position, so he carries the seal and insignia to surrender to 刘邦. The episode then contrasts two post-Qin possibilities: Liu Bang protects Ziying, preserves old officials, captures administrative records through 萧何, and issues 约法三章 at 霸上, while 项羽 kills surrendered Qin troops at 新安坑降 and thereby makes Qin-population support harder to win.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》102-1｜吕不韦是姜子牙后人？ gives Qin Zhuangxiang Wang’s first-year state actions. Qin appoints 吕不韦 as chancellor, uses him to destroy 东周国 after its anti-Qin plotting, and rewards him as Wenxin Hou. Qin also sends 蒙敖 against 韩国, takes Chenggao, and establishes 三川 commandery, so the succession payoff immediately appears as both court staffing and eastward administrative consolidation.

《资治通鉴·周纪》12丨 公孙鞅求职路上的拉关系 走后门 adds Qin’s recruitment-turn between accession pressure and institutional reform. 秦孝公 invokes 秦穆公’s old greatness, names Qin’s disorder and lost western lands as shame, and promises office plus land to anyone who can strengthen the state. 公孙鞅 / 商鞅 then enters through 景监, showing that Qin’s openness to talent still runs through private access before it becomes 商鞅变法.

《资治通鉴·周纪》13丨 公孙鞅苛刻变法惹杀身（1） adds Qin’s institutional reform branch under 秦孝公. 公孙鞅 / 商鞅 receives the ruler’s backing, defeats 甘龙’s custom-based objection, and begins 商鞅变法 through household registration, mutual surveillance, agricultural incentives, severe punishment, 军功爵制, and 徙木立信. The episode turns Qin from a rising military pressure into a state remaking its social order for war and control.

《资治通鉴·周纪》13丨 公孙鞅苛刻变法惹杀身（2） shows the first major public enforcement test of that remade order. 太子嬴驷’s violation is handled through punishment of the prince’s tutors, linking 公子虔 and 公孙贾 to a high-status law-enforcement signal. The source says this produces visible obedience by the next day and, over ten years, a Qin society that is orderly, publicly war-ready, and privately restrained.

《资治通鉴·周纪》17丨韩昭侯和申不害 gives Qin the next paired military and administrative turn. Qin under 公孙鞅 / 商鞅 presses Wei at 安邑 and 固阳, pushing Wei toward the 漳水之盟 with Zhao and accommodation with Qi. In 350 BCE the same reform branch moves Qin’s capital to 咸阳, enforces 分居令, and expands county, land, and measurement standardization.

《资治通鉴·周纪》18丨中国历史上第一例人头税 adds Qin’s fiscal and status branch. 公孙鞅 / 商鞅’s 348 BCE tax reform is read as likely 人头税, while 周王室’s 343 BCE recognition of Qin hegemon status elevates 秦孝公 among the lords. Qin Xiao Gong does not attend personally; 公子少官 appears with troops at 逢泽.

《资治通鉴·周纪》22丨公孙鞅诈魏公子卬 gives Qin a direct 340 BCE offensive branch. Shang Yang advises Qin Xiao Gong that 魏国’s post-Maling weakness is an opening for Qin to seize western advantage and push east. The campaign also shows Qin’s 耕战逻辑 in action: war is not only foreign policy, but the reward channel that makes an empty-handed withdrawal improbable under the 军功爵制.

《资治通鉴·周纪》23丨魏惠王 悔不用公叔之言 adds the payoff and succession cost. Qin turns 公子卬 / 公子昂’s capture into battlefield victory, receives Hexi territory, rewards 公孙鞅 / 商鞅 with 商於, and then loses 秦孝公. After 嬴驷 succeeds, the same Qin legal order that strengthened the state becomes the setting for 公子虔’s accusation and Shang Yang’s 作法自毙.

《资治通鉴·周纪》24丨商鞅曰：我咋裂了 reframes Qin as the place where outsider talent can rise quickly and become trapped. 秦穆公’s recognition of 百里奚 supplies an earlier successful model, while 秦孝公’s backing lets Shang Yang exceed the old restoration ideal. The same episode stresses that Qin’s harsh reform order and accumulated resentment make Shang Yang’s exit problem inseparable from Qin’s state-building success.

《资治通鉴·周纪》25丨赵良对商鞅说：你不配 adds Qin as the society whose response decides a minister’s safety. 赵良 contrasts Qin’s mourning for 百里奚 with Qin’s resentment toward 公孙鞅 / 商鞅, then treats Shang Yang’s guard dependence as evidence that Qin’s reform success did not produce stable social support for its architect.

《资治通鉴·周纪》27丨围观魏惠王和齐威王是咋商业互捧 extends Qin’s pressure into 335 BCE. Qin attacks 韩国 and takes 宜阳, which the episode describes as a long-coveted strategic target comparable to Wei’s Hexi lands. The notice keeps Qin eastward pressure active even as the episode’s main focus shifts to Qi-Wei diplomacy.

《资治通鉴·周纪》30丨苏秦的“开挂”人生 adds Qin as a failed stop in 苏秦’s renewed lobbying itinerary. Su Qin approaches 秦惠文王, but the episode says Qin has just executed 公孙鞅 / 商鞅 and is not receptive to wandering persuaders. Qin also remains the distant threat in Su Qin’s later argument that 燕国 needs 赵国 as a protective shield.

《资治通鉴·周纪》31丨合纵连横 围殴秦 makes Qin the active enemy around which 合纵 forms. Qin’s attack on 魏国, capture of 龙甲, and seizure of Diaoyin force Su Qin to stabilize the western threat by sending 张仪 into Qin. The same episode introduces 连横 as the Qin-facing alternative that Su Qin attacks rhetorically even while using Zhang Yi’s rise at Qin for tactical cover.

《资治通鉴·周纪》33丨历史第一爽文男主角苏秦 adds Qin as the state allegedly checked by Su Qin’s completed alliance. 《史记》 says Qin troops did not dare leave 函谷关 for fifteen years, but the episode marks this as a claim to test against the coming 《资治通鉴》 account of renewed Qin action and alliance collapse.

《资治通鉴·周纪》34丨秦国总理如何玩转六国 supplies that sequel. Qin uses 犀首公孙衍 to disturb the Qi-Wei-Zhao side of 合纵, keeps taking or extracting Wei territory from 殷晋 through 少梁, 河西, 焦邑, and 曲沃, then lets 张仪 turn the return of 蒲阳 into 上郡’s fifteen counties. Qin’s strength here is diplomatic as well as military: it can alternate force, concessions, hostage signaling, and psychological pressure.

《资治通鉴·周纪》35丨历史上第一骑兵教父是他？ widens Qin’s problem from the eastern Wei front to its western/rear frontier. Qin defeats 义渠, occupies part of its territory, and incorporates captured land into Qin’s county system, but the episode stresses that Yiqu is not yet destroyed. The same source resolves Zhouji 34’s closing question by reading Qin’s return of 焦邑 and 曲沃 to 魏国 as 张仪’s half-pull, half-hit diplomacy before 秦惠文王 claims kingly status.

《资治通鉴·周纪》36丨卫嗣君的帝王之术 gives Qin the kingly-title payoff. 秦惠文王 claims royal title in 324 BCE, and the episode says the move causes less shock than 徐州相王 because the precedent exists and Qin’s strength makes resistance less attractive. Qin also functions as the great-power priority in 武夏’s later analogy to 魏惠王 / 梁惠王.

《资治通鉴·周纪》37丨苏秦：六国集团CEO的不堪情史 keeps Qin active in the same 324-323 BCE frame. 张仪 attacks 魏国, takes 陕城, and returns the people while keeping the place, making Qin’s pressure selective and territorial. The following year Zhang Yi meets Qi and Chu ministers at 啮桑, possibly to improve Qin’s diplomatic room or to counter 犀首公孙衍, who has left Qin for Wei and is now organizing against Qin.

《资治通鉴·周纪》38丨搞兼职的张仪不一般 adds Qin as the beneficiary of Zhang Yi’s ambiguous move to Wei. Through a 《战国策》 supplement, 秦武王 accepts Zhang Yi’s argument that sending him to 魏国 can draw 齐国 into conflict and give Qin room to move. In the annalistic notice, when Wei refuses Zhang Yi’s proposed Qin-facing posture, Qin attacks and takes 曲沃 and 平州.

《资治通鉴·周纪》39丨历史上张仪是怎样怒怼强敌的 shows Qin’s influence working through personnel psychology as well as attack. 秦惠文王 secretly rewards 张仪 despite the failed Wei mission, creating 恩赏负债式忠诚压力 that pulls Zhang Yi’s allegiance back toward Qin. The episode also says Zhang Yi secretly coordinates with Qin against 魏国, making the Wei chief-minister role another channel for Qin-facing pressure.

《资治通鉴·周纪》45｜以史为鉴，君王到底该不该杀人成性？ adds two early 周纪三 Qin pressure points. In 319 BCE Qin attacks 韩国 and takes Yanling. In 318 BCE, five eastern states reach 函谷关 against Qin, but Qin cuts the Chu army’s grain route and triggers the coalition’s withdrawal. The episode therefore keeps Qin as the state strong enough to generate 合纵 while also exposing 联盟自保失灵 among its opponents.

《资治通鉴·周纪》46丨骂你是个“二百五”的历史来源 gives Qin the counterattack sequel in 317 BCE. Under 樗里子, Qin pursues 韩国 and 魏国 after the failed Hangu Pass campaign, wins heavily at 修鱼之战, and continues fighting at 浊泽. The source makes Qin’s strength feel less like passive defense behind a pass and more like retaliatory reach into the central plains.

《资治通鉴·周纪》48丨君王为啥不能传位宰相 adds the 314 BCE multi-front notices in Zhou Nan Wang’s first year. Qin attacks 义渠 and takes twenty-five cities, suppresses a source-scoped Wey/Quwo unrest notice by taking 曲沃, and defeats 韩国 at 岸门, after which Han sends crown prince 韩仓 / 韩襄王 to Qin as hostage. The cluster keeps Qin’s eastward pressure linked to rear-frontier instability and nearby hostage diplomacy.

《资治通鉴·周纪》50丨张仪是怎样把楚怀王忽悠瘸的 gives Qin a 313 BCE two-track move. 樗里子 attacks 赵国 and captures Lingcheng’s defender, while 秦惠文王 sends 张仪 to break 楚国 away from 齐国 before Qin attacks Qi. Qin’s pressure here is diplomatic as well as military: the promised 商於 land isolates Chu first, then the six-li reversal turns Chu’s anger into a separate Qin-Chu conflict.

《资治通鉴·周纪》51丨 楚怀王：秦小儿看舅舅如何灭了你！ records the military payoff of that conflict in 312 BCE. Qin defeats Chu at 丹阳之战, captures 屈匄, takes 汉中, then draws Chu deeper through 武关 and 商於 before winning again near 蓝田之战. Qin therefore converts Zhang Yi’s alliance-breaking diplomacy into territory, battlefield attrition, and a settlement in which Chu cedes cities.

《资治通鉴·周纪》52丨 陈庄叛秦 端起碗吃饭放下碗骂娘 adds Qin’s southwestern governance problem after its conquest of 巴国 and 蜀国. The source traces the setup to 司马错 persuading 秦惠文王 to attack Shu, then shows Qin leaving 蜀侯宁通 as marquis and appointing 陈庄 as chancellor. Chen Zhuang’s later killing of Shu Hou Ning Tong and rebellion makes Qin’s strength depend not only on expansion but on controlling local appointees in 巴蜀.

《资治通鉴·周纪》53丨秦惠王用张仪换地皮 returns Qin from southwestern rebellion to Chu-facing diplomacy. Qin proposes exchanging land around 武关 and 商於 for 黔中, while Chu counters by demanding 张仪. The episode reads Qin’s advantage broadly: Qin’s strength deters Chu from killing Zhang Yi, Qin’s Ba-Shu base threatens Chu from the west, and 秦惠文王 may gain whether Zhang Yi is used, ransomed, or killed. Qin therefore appears as a state capable of converting both territory and personnel risk into leverage.

《资治通鉴·周纪》54丨我尊你是王，你当我是屁 turns Qin’s leverage into a multi-state persuasion campaign. Zhang Yi uses Qin’s military strength, geography, and alleged control over other states to pressure 韩国, 齐国, and 赵国 toward 连横, then visits 燕国. Qin also becomes a succession-risk setting: 秦惠文王 dies before Zhang Yi returns to 咸阳, and 秦武王’s accession exposes Zhang Yi to 靠山更替暴露风险.

《资治通鉴·周纪》55丨 张仪痛失贵人秦惠王 shows the aftermath. Yan gives five cities and seeks peace, but Qin’s court transition shakes the lianheng settlement enough that the lords renew 合纵. Qin then becomes the audience for Zhang Yi’s exit pitch: send him to 魏国, let 齐国 attack, and use the distraction to threaten Han and 三川.

《资治通鉴·周纪》58丨赵武灵王如何打造强国 completes the Qin Wuwang branch from another angle. Qin reinforces 甘茂 after the Xirang oath is invoked, takes 宜阳, and forces 韩国 to seek peace. The state then suffers a sudden succession shock when Qin Wuwang dies at 洛邑 after the ding-lifting episode, bringing 秦昭襄王 and 芈八子 / 宣太后 into the next Qin configuration.

《资治通鉴·周纪》59丨一朝君王一朝臣 shows that configuration beginning under pressure. Qin administers newly taken Yiyang through 向寿, accepts Gan Mao’s advice to return 武遂 to Han, and then watches Gan Mao’s position collapse as Qin Wuwang’s death changes the court balance. The same source says Qin Wuwang’s brothers fight for the throne and 魏冉 secures Ying Ji as Qin Zhaoxiang Wang, while Chu, Qi, and Han use Qin’s transition to rebuild 合纵.

《资治通鉴·周纪》60丨 中国第一位把持朝政的太后竟是她？ turns that transition into Qin’s early Zhaoxiang Wang court order. 魏冉 guards 咸阳, suppresses 嬴壮’s revolt, and helps consolidate 芈八子 / 宣太后’s 太后摄政 and 楚系外戚政治. Qin then warms relations with 楚国 through marriage, the 黄棘 meeting, and the return of 上庸, while attacking 魏国 at 蒲阪, 阳晋, and 封陵 and retaking 武遂 from 韩国. After 芈横 kills a Qin official and escapes, Qin repairs relations with Han and Wei at 临晋 and returns Puban to Wei, making Qin’s diplomacy a clear case of 战国同盟转向.

《资治通鉴·周纪》68丨惊叹宋康王荒淫无度的狗血历史（1） shows Qin pressing beyond those early Zhaoxiang settlements. After Wei and Han have already ceded land, Qin sends 白起 and 司马错 against 魏国, later takes 安邑, and tests a higher title by proposing Qin Zhaoxiang Wang as western emperor and 齐湣王 as eastern emperor. The episode makes Qin’s power both territorial and symbolic, but 苏代’s response and renewed 合纵 pressure force Qin to drop the emperor title.

《资治通鉴·周纪》62丨稷儿，诓你舅舅的“腿”啊 continues that reversal into coercion against Chu’s ruler. Qin invites 楚怀王 to 武关, seizes him, takes him to 咸阳, and demands 巫郡 plus 黔中. The episode explicitly condemns Qin’s bad faith but explains why Qin dares to act: Chu is diplomatically isolated after years of alliance failures and weakened court feedback.

《资治通鉴·周纪》63丨 德高望重孟尝君是伪君子？ gives Qin two follow-on moves in Zhou Nan Wang’s seventeenth year. First, Qin treats 孟尝君 / 田文 as a loyalty risk because he is a 齐国 aristocrat, replaces him with 楼缓, and almost kills him before his retainers help him escape. Second, after 楚国 installs 芈横 / 楚顷襄王 and reduces the leverage of Chu Huaiwang’s detention, Qin attacks Chu through 武关, killing fifty thousand and taking sixteen cities.

《资治通鉴·周纪》73丨历史上自由恋爱的开创者是谁？ adds Qin’s post-anti-Qi coalition reaction. After 乐毅 compensates distant allies with wealth, Qin is presented as unwilling to settle for treasure; it attacks 魏国, captures 安城, and advances toward 大梁. The episode therefore makes Qin a driver of 联军战后利益失衡 as well as a continuing eastward pressure force.

《资治通鉴·周纪》74丨还原完璧归赵真相！ adds a Qin-Zhao exchange branch rather than a direct conquest branch. 秦昭襄王 offers fifteen cities for 和氏璧, but Qin’s failure to discuss actual city transfer lets 蔺相如 turn the exchange into 完璧归赵式外交. Qin still has the stronger coercive position, but the episode stresses that visible non-performance and envoy handling limit what Qin gains once the jade has returned to Zhao.

《资治通鉴·周纪》76丨谁给了楚顷襄王的自信？ returns Qin to direct Zhao-facing pressure. After 赵惠文王赵何 refuses Qin’s proposal to attack 齐国, Qin attacks 赵国, takes cities, attacks again the next year, and captures 石城. The same episode records 魏冉 returning as chancellor and previews the 渑池 meeting invitation, so Qin’s pressure combines retaliation, territory, court staffing, and risky diplomacy.

《资治通鉴·周纪》77丨廉颇与蔺相如 史上最著名的一对“好基友” adds the next step in 280-279 BCE. Qin uses 白起 against Zhao and then Chu, while 司马错 leads a difficult southwestern move through 巴蜀 toward Chu’s Qianzhong region. The episode also shows a limit to Qin coercion: at 渑池, 蔺相如 prevents Qin Zhaoxiang Wang’s banquet pressure from becoming a one-sided humiliation of Zhao.

《资治通鉴·周纪》82丨大秦的核武器：白起来了！ shows Qin converting the Chu front into both terror and administration. 白起 breaks the Chu capital region, Qin creates 南郡, then takes 巫郡 and 黔中 and reorganizes Qianzhong as a Qin commandery. The episode also explains Qin’s target switch: because 楚国 gains strategic depth after moving toward Chen, Qin first pounds 魏国 through Bai Qi and 魏冉 to control the central-plains passage problem.

《资治通鉴·周纪》83丨诸侯摆烂竟成了经典计中计？ shows Qin turning another state’s plea into its own strategic gain. When 韩国 is attacked by 魏国 and 赵国 at 华阳之战, the Han envoy’s 投敌威胁式求援 makes non-intervention costly for Qin. 魏冉 and 白起 then rescue Han and crush Wei-Zhao, after which Wei’s land-for-peace debate reinforces Qin’s role in 抱薪救火式割地求和.

《资治通鉴·周纪》84丨防止秦国灭楚竟用这招？ shows Qin choosing restraint after that leverage has pulled Han and Wei into its orbit. 黄歇 / 春申君 persuades 秦昭襄王 that another anti-Chu campaign through Han and Wei would create rear-route danger and let 齐国, 赵国, or Wei profit while Qin bears the risk. Qin therefore stops 白起, dismisses Han-Wei troops, and turns temporary restraint into Qin-Chu alliance logic.

《资治通鉴·周纪》85｜宣太后为何私通30年后暗杀了老情人？ moves Qin from the Chu route problem to the northern rear-frontier problem. The episode says 芈八子 / 宣太后’s long relationship with the 义渠 king helped keep Qin’s rear stable during Qin’s external campaigns. Once the balance changes, she kills him at 甘泉宫, Qin destroys Yiqu, and the new 北地郡 joins 陇西郡 and 上郡 as a defensive line. Qin’s rise therefore looks like simultaneous eastward pressure, southern corridor calculation, and rear-frontier absorption.

《资治通鉴·周纪》87丨“狭路相逢勇者胜”终于找到出处了！ adds a failed Zhao-front pressure case. Qin attacks 阏与 / 燕宇之战 after a broken Qin-Zhao settlement, but 赵奢 lets a Qin spy observe apparent inaction, then force-marches, camps near the battlefield, and beats Qin to the northern high ground. The episode therefore adds an example where Qin pressure is checked by deception and terrain timing rather than by coalition diplomacy.

《资治通鉴·周纪》88丨你怎么看待凤凰男（1） turns Qin’s strength inward toward court control. 魏冉 recommends 客卿灶 / 客卿造 to attack 齐国 and seize territory near 陶 / 定陶, but the episode reads this as 以国战扩私邑 rather than a clean Qin state-interest campaign. The same source then brings 范雎 toward Qin through 王稽 / 王继, making Qin both the state whose military machine can be bent by an overmighty minister and the state that can absorb talent damaged by 魏国.

《资治通鉴·周纪》88丨你怎么看待凤凰男（2） gives Qin the strategic answer to that court-control problem. Fan Ju criticizes distant attack on Qi, cites 齐湣王’s unretainable attack on 楚国, and proposes 远交近攻: Qin should manage far states diplomatically and attack neighboring states whose land can be directly kept. The source therefore makes Qin’s rise depend not only on force, but on making strategy subordinate to ruler authority rather than to Wei Ran’s private geography.

《资治通鉴·周纪》89丨秦王竟被他怼“妈宝男”？ continues Qin’s near-front pressure while exposing the court condition behind it. Qin fails against Zhao’s Yan Yu / Eyu under 胡伤 / 胡阳, attacks Wei through 武大夫绾, and takes Xingqiu after 秦悼太子 dies in Wei. Fan Ju then turns to 秦国四贵权力结构, arguing that Qin’s state force will remain distorted unless 秦昭襄王 can free policy from 宣太后, 魏冉, and the royal-kin bloc.

《资治通鉴·周纪》90丨揭秘先秦最完美的复仇 shows that recovered state force becoming Fan Ju’s instrument. Qin reduces Wei Ran and the four-nobles bloc, then keeps pressure on nearby 魏国 until Wei sends 须贾 for peace. Qin’s threat against 大梁 gives Fan Ju’s private demand for 魏齐’s head the form of state coercion, making Qin the setting for 以国力行私仇.

《资治通鉴·周纪》91丨触龙如何敲开守寡赵太后的门（1） keeps Qin’s 265 BCE pressure active while explaining why Zhao is now vulnerable. Qin attacks 赵国 and is also attacking 韩国, so the source treats the Zhao campaign as compatible with 远交近攻 rather than as a simple strategic reversal. Qin’s pressure pushes Zhao toward 齐国 and indirectly creates the 长安君 hostage crisis.

《资治通鉴·周纪》91丨触龙如何敲开守寡赵太后的门（2） gives the limit of that pressure: once Chang’an Jun is sent to Qi and Qi intervenes, Qin withdraws from Zhao. In this source, Qin’s attack remains effective enough to force Zhao’s domestic hostage decision, but not enough to hold the campaign against a repaired Qi-Zhao response.

《资治通鉴·周纪》92丨历史上第一位著名舔狗是谁？（1） moves Qin’s pressure back to 韩国. Under 范雎’s 远交近攻, 白起 takes cities, captures 韩国南阳, attacks 太行道, and isolates 上党. The episode also shows Qin using money-based sabotage against renewed 合纵 organizers in 赵国, while Qin’s handling of 太子完 keeps hostage suspicion active on the Chu front.

《资治通鉴·周纪》92丨历史上第一位著名舔狗是谁？（2） shows Qin after that hostage suspicion fails. Mi Wan reaches Chu, Huang Xie discloses the deception, and Qin has to choose between punishing the remaining Chu actor and salvaging influence with the likely new king. 范雎’s advice to send Huang Xie back makes Qin’s hostage policy look pragmatic even after tactical loss.

《资治通鉴·周纪》93丨在梦里藏着偷天改命？（1） shows Qin pressure continuing on two fronts after that transition. 楚考烈王 cedes land to Qin in his first year, and 白起’s earlier Han-front route severance now pushes 冯亭 to offer 上党 to 赵国. Qin’s campaign therefore keeps working even when Qin is not the deliberating court: its pressure shapes Chu concession, Han local desperation, and Zhao’s tempting but dangerous choice.

《资治通鉴·周纪》93丨在梦里藏着偷天改命？（2） adds Qin as the hidden capacity standard inside Zhao’s debate. 赵豹 / 平阳君 warns that Qin’s cattle farming, water transport, and reward incentives give it durable military-administrative advantage. The episode therefore makes Qin frightening even offstage: Zhao’s acceptance of 上党 is not only a diplomatic insult to Qin, but a decision to face a state whose 耕战逻辑 and 军功爵制 make retaliation credible.

《资治通鉴·周纪》94丨杀神白起，长平之战中的“草包”名将？（1） shows Qin converting that credible retaliation into diplomatic and command advantage. Qin receives 郑朱 visibly so other states see Zhao seeking peace, while not actually settling. 范雎 then uses money and agents to make 赵丹 / 赵孝成王 distrust 廉颇 and appoint 赵括. Finally, Qin secretly places 白起 above 王龁 and threatens death for anyone who reveals the appointment, giving Qin an information advantage as 长平之战 turns toward battle.

《资治通鉴·周纪》94丨杀神白起，长平之战中的“草包”名将？（2） shows Qin converting that information advantage into a logistics victory. Bai Qi lures Zhao Kuo’s attacking army against prepared barriers, cuts its rear and food route with side forces and cavalry, and uses fieldworks to keep the separation closed. Once the supply route is severed, Qin Zhaoxiang Wang’s Henei mobilization makes the encirclement a whole-state effort rather than only a battlefield maneuver.

《资治通鉴·周纪》94丨杀神白起，长平之战中的“草包”名将？（3） gives Qin the victory’s brutal endpoint and its limit. After Zhao Kuo’s breakout fails and the Zhao army surrenders, Bai Qi kills the surrendered troops, a decision the source frames through captive security and moral horror. Qin’s later attempt to keep pressure on Zhao through 王陵 at 邯郸 then shows that even a massive victory leaves Qin exposed to war-cost limits when people and food are depleted.

《资治通鉴·周纪》95丨长平之战后秦国为什么没有灭了赵国（1） explains the first pause after that endpoint. Qin continues pressure through 王龁 against 武安 and 皮牢 and through 司马梗 against 太原 and 上党郡, but 苏代 makes 范雎 fear that 白起’s destruction of 赵国 would turn the general into a rank threat. Qin therefore takes 垣雍 from 韩国 and six cities from Zhao, buying rest while still extracting territory.

《资治通鉴·周纪》95丨长平之战后秦国为什么没有灭了赵国（2） shows the pause failing to become stable peace. Zhao’s reluctance to deliver the six cities turns Qin’s accepted rest-and-cession bargain into anger and renewed pressure, while Yu Qing’s proposed Qi transfer tries to turn the same land cost into anti-Qin leverage. The episode’s Wei branch adds a structural explanation for why Qin remains frightening after one victory: neighboring ministers may hope Qin stops with Zhao, but 孔斌 reads Qin’s post-商鞅变法 order as a war machine that needs continued campaigns.

《资治通鉴·周纪》95丨长平之战后秦国为什么没有灭了赵国（3） shows that Qin’s pressure also travels through hostage and revenge channels. 秦昭襄王 detains 平原君 to force 魏齐’s head for 范雎, converting private vengeance and aristocratic hosting into a Qin-Zhao coercion problem. Qin releases Pingyuanjun after receiving the head, but continues military pressure through 王陵 against 邯郸.

《资治通鉴·周纪》96丨毛遂自荐（1） makes that continued pressure hit a command limit. Wang Ling fails at Handan, reinforcements add losses without producing a breakthrough, and Qin Zhaoxiang Wang cannot compel 白起 to take the assignment even after 范雎 urges him. Qin keeps the campaign alive by appointing 王龁, but the episode makes Qin’s post-Changping power look constrained by distance, depletion, enemy morale, and allied-rescue risk.

《资治通鉴·周纪》96丨毛遂自荐（2） shows Qin using intimidation to keep that allied-rescue risk from materializing. 毛遂 secures 楚国’s commitment to aid Zhao, but Qin’s warning makes 魏安釐王 halt 晋鄙 at 邺城, which also blocks the likely route for Chu relief. Qin’s pressure then appears as hierarchy as well as siege: 新垣衍 proposes that Zhao and Wei honor 秦昭襄王 as western emperor to buy withdrawal.

《资治通鉴·周纪》97-1丨白起之死 records the failure of that intimidation once 信陵君 forces Wei’s army into motion and Chu aid joins the field. Qin’s continued Handan pressure now produces battlefield losses, repeated aid requests from 王龁, and a court crisis around 白起, whose warning against the campaign looks correct after the fact. The episode makes Qin’s post-Changping position less like unstoppable conquest than a stressed war machine whose ruler cannot tolerate a famous commander saying the failed campaign was predictable.

《资治通鉴·周纪》98丨历史上首个老赖登场了！ shows Qin recovering the initiative in the chronicle frame after the Handan setback. Qin pressure continues against 韩国 and 赵国, and when 周赧王 joins the anti-Qin line under the 周王室 name, Qin punishes the royal house directly by absorbing 西周国’s cities and people. The source therefore makes Qin’s rise the reason 周纪 ends and the narrative prepares to enter Qin-centered chronology.

《资治通鉴·秦纪》99-1｜历史第一丑男逆袭做秦相 turns that preparation into explicit 编年分期. The episode distinguishes Qin as a state with centuries of history from the formal Qin dynasty that begins in 221 BCE, then uses 秦昭襄王’s fifty-second year as the opening Qin纪 frame. Qin is therefore both a still-Warring-States polity and the chronicle’s new dating center after the Zhou royal line collapses.

The same source also shows Qin’s internal cost after the 邯郸 campaign. 白起 is gone, 郑安平 has defected, and 王稽 / 王继 is executed, leaving 范雎 exposed and giving 蔡泽 a chance to argue that completed merit should be followed by retreat.

秦国 / Qin State appears in 《资治通鉴·周纪》06丨魏文侯选谁当宰相呢（2） through 秦嬴, whom the episode explains as a Qin princess by name pattern rather than as someone surnamed Qin. The source also uses Qin-Jin intermarriage to explain the idiom “秦晋之好.”

This page is source-scoped and mainly supports the episode’s kinship and assassination-attribution example. It connects backward to 晋国 and forward to the wiki’s existing Qin-related material through 秦始皇.

《资治通鉴·周纪》07丨两起刺杀（1） adds an early Warring States Qin chronology branch: Qin attacks 魏国 in 401 BCE, then 秦简公 dies and his son 秦惠公 succeeds him in 400 BCE.

《资治通鉴·周纪》08丨一代名将吴起惨死（2） continues the succession line: Qin Hui Gong dies in 387 BCE and his son 秦出公 succeeds. The same source also makes Qin a strategic pressure point for 吴起’s 楚国 reforms because Wu Qi opposes making peace with Qin.

《资治通鉴·周纪》08丨一代名将吴起惨死（3） completes Qin Chugong’s short branch with a coup in 385 BCE. Shuzhang Gai brings 秦献公 back from exile in 卫国, installs him, and kills Qin Chugong and his mother. The episode treats the coup as evidence that Qin’s pre-Shang-Yang politics were still vulnerable to regency legitimacy problems, palace influence, and returning-royal claims.

《资治通鉴·周纪》10丨 以家族单位 有蚂蚁吃大象的精神（1） adds a Qin-origin and diplomacy branch. Through 《史记》’s 太史旦 story, the episode traces Qin from 非子 under 周孝王 to 秦襄公’s recognition by 周平王 and 秦文公’s recovery of western territory, then reads the speech to 秦献公 as kinship legitimacy diplomacy.

《资治通鉴·周纪》11丨 世界风起云涌（1） adds Qin’s early 周显王 military-pressure branch. Qin defeats a Wei-Han joint force at Luoyang Jinjiao in 366 BCE, defeats the Three Jin coalition at 石门之战 in 364 BCE, and continues attacking Wei at Shaoliang in 363 BCE. The source treats this as Qin eastward pressure becoming visible before later Qin dominance.

《资治通鉴·周纪》11丨 世界风起云涌（2） extends that early branch into 362 BCE. Qin defeats 魏国 at 少梁, captures a Wei figure rendered as 公孙措 / 公孙痤 / 公叔痤, and then moves from 秦献公 to 秦孝公. The episode’s main addition is 秦 diplomatic exclusion: Qin is militarily dangerous but still treated by eastern states as a peripheral, not-quite-normal polity outside their meeting order.

《资治通鉴·周纪》14丨齐威王 不鸣则已一鸣惊人 keeps Qin as the western pressure source in 358 BCE. Qin defeats 韩国 at West Mountain, prompting 魏国 to send 龙甲 to build defensive works, while the same year Qin receives 右尹黑 from 楚国 for a marriage-diplomacy mission.

《资治通鉴·周纪》15丨酒不醇引发的世界大战 continues the same pressure into 355-354 BCE. 秦孝公 meets 魏惠王 at Duping, but the episode infers that the meeting fails because Qin soon defeats 魏国 at Yuanli and occupies 少梁. The source also uses Qin’s enemy-head reward formula to connect this war notice back to the 军功爵制.

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